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ABSTRACT
The introduction consists of a general statement 
of the problem of free-will.
The chapter on Hume begins with a brief sketch of 
his metaphysical position, followed by an analysis of his 
conception of necessity. His arguments against the idea of 
liberty are then evaluated. In connection with this the 
concept of prediction is also discussed and it has been 
attempted to show that freedom of spontaneity is, either, 
not freedom, or has no distinction with freedom of 
indifference. His arguments from the standpoint of morality 
and religion are critically considered. His effort to prove 
the problem of free-will as verbal is shown to be 
inconclusive.
Mill’s metaphysical position is not discussed in 
detail but only occasionally referred to or presupposed.
The inconsistencies of his language in describing causality 
and necessity are pointed out. Next, his analysés of the 
direct consciousness of free-will, and of free-will which 
is involved in the idea of morality, are discussed and 
criticized, together with his conception of ’one’s desire 
to mould one’s character”. Reference has been made to 
his theory of punishment.
The chapter on Bradley deals with a description of 
his analysis of the ’vulgar notion of responsibility* 
followed by a critical treatment of his arguments against 
Libertarianism and Necessitarianism, with reference to his 
notion of predictability. Attempt has been made to estimate 
how far the introduction of a notion of absolute self can 
do justice to the popular conceptions of freedom and 
moral-responsibility. In the context of moral responsibility, 
reference is made to his theory of punishment.
The conclusion consists of a summary of the results 
of the previous chapters and a comparative discussion of 
the merits of each view as a reconciling project.
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INTRODUCTION
The problem of free-will is not a new problem, but 
too old to comment anything new. It is so very complicated, 
partly because philosophers have treated it from so many 
different standpoints. Moreover, it has given rise to 
diverse issues connected with the different aspects of 
human life. On the one hand, it relates to our psychological 
and scientific discoveries, a relevant change in which, 
might mean a change in our notion of freedom. On the other 
hand, our conception of ethics, religion and law are 
dependent on our notion of free-will. For instance, the 
discoveries, made in the field of science and psychology 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, have moulded our 
notion of free-will in a considerable way, as a result of 
which we have learned to view the ethical and other problems 
from a different angle than what we used to do before. This 
happens because in the first place, the different issues 
arising out of the idea of freedom are interwoven and 
secondly, this problem, unlike other philosophical problems, 
cannot be discussed in isolation.
There is nothing as common, simple and apparently 
indubitable as our ordinary experience of free-will.
Everyone feels the presence or absence of it, whenever a
question of the exercise of choice or action arises. But 
when we go beyond our personal feeling and compare it with 
other fundamental concepts and laws of our life, there 
seems to be no other idea which is so ambiguous, conflicting 
and inconsistent as our notion of free-will. It is difficult 
to eradicate the feeling of freedom from our consciousness. 
It is also difficult to maintain it in the face of our 
other experiences.
One such experience is our causal experience. To 
speak truly, the issue of free-will arises from its 
conflict with the law of causality which is more or less 
unanimously believed at the level of educated common sense. 
From the standpoint of science, all phenomena, it is 
thought, are causally connected including the phenomena of 
our minds. The implication of the causal connection is that 
the cause-event and the effect-event are invariably 
connected. This invariable connection is sometimes stated 
in the form of a necessary relation, and some other times 
in the form of a regular sequence. In both cases, it means, 
that given the cause, the effect follows regularly, i.e. 
the effect is determined by the cause and where the cause 
is known, the effect can be predicted.
7Such causal determinism when extended to the human 
mind, means that the action follows from the volition 
which again follows from our formed character and 
circumstances. Like physical events, all mental phenomena 
are also subject to causal law and necessity.
Our feeling of freedom, which Sidgwick has called 
"the immediate affirmation of consciousness in the moment 
of deliberate action",^ is in direct dispute with this 
notion of causation. The dispute arises from their mutual 
incompatibility.
So far as the meaning of the term 'free-will* is 
concerned, we are faced with certain difficulties. There is 
no agreed definition of what we mean by free-will or 
freedom of the will. Sometimes, it is thought that free­
will means that our will is free. Then, it will mean, that 
our will, which is regarded as an agent, has the ability to 
act as it wills. But usually^ by free-will, we do not mean 
that our will is free, but that we are free to will. Yet, 
what the philosophers mean by calling a man free to will is 
difficult to ascertain. Their opinions are divergent and 
often mutually contradictory. They have formulated their 
definitions of freedom in accordance with their respective 
philosophies. As a result, sometimes it is said, that free-
1. H. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, 6th Ed. p.65. Edt.1901.
8will means uncaused will; at other times, it is said, that 
free-will means caused volition, hut caused in a special 
way, i.e* in one case, in order to he free, my volition 
should be without a cause; in another case, like the rest of 
the universe, my volition is always caused; but some of 
these causes exert constraint or compulsion, and others 
do not, and, in the latter case, only my will can be called 
free.
This explanation of free-will has been accepted by 
the empirical philosophers. For them, freedom is not 
opposite to causal necessity, as nothing can happen without 
a cause. On the contrary, the free-actions are also caused 
actions. The difference between free and not-free action 
is one of constraint which is present in the latter, but 
not in the former. Hence, the solution of the problem of 
free-will, for the upholders of empiricism, lies in 
clearing up the ambiguities of the meanings of the terms 
involved in the issue.
The empirical interpretation of free-will is 
consistent with the law of causation, but free-will implies 
not only the absence of constraint, but also the presence of 
choice or alternative action. Where there is no scope for 
alternative action, there in spite of the absence of
constraint, free-will becomes doubtful.
The freedom of choice is not at all compatible with 
the causal law. Because causal relation means an invariable 
connection between the cause and the effect, i.e# given the 
cause, the effect must follow and it cannot be otherwise, 
while choice implies that an action can be otherwise.
The idea of free-choice is essentially connected with 
our ethical and juridical laws. The concepts of moral 
responsibility, punishment, blame etc, presuppose the 
existence of free choice. Ve cannot call a man morally 
responsible for the action which he cannot help. Nor can we 
punish someone for an action of which he has no choice.
If every action inevitably follows from our formed character 
and circumstances, no room for choice can be allowed# The 
empirical theory of free-will as such, cannot account for 
the presence of choice in our voluntary action.
This has taught the later Idealists to search for 
the solution from another perspective. The notion of free­
will not only involves a notion of choice, but also a notion 
of personal self. Free-will means *1' am free to will# The 
action follows from my own personality or self# The 
determination of the will comes from the self. The Idealists 
in their interpretation of free-will give importance to this
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notion of a rational self, from which all actions follow, 
eventually. Because the self is rational, therefore, the 
actions following from it aim to he consistent and 
gradually advance towards the realization of a higher goal.
Such a conception of action is quite compatible with 
the law of causation, and the Idealists do not raise the 
question of free-choice, which is more or less impossible 
in their metaphysics. They ascribe moral responsibility to 
a person, on the ground that the action follows from the 
self of the person concerned, and from no other entity.
These are the issues in outline, which I want to 
discuss in this paper. I restrict my paper to an analysis 
and criticism of the views of Hume, Mill and Bradley, 
because they are the best exponents of these two different 
types of interpretation of the notion of free-will. Hume 
and Mill represent the general empirical outlook on the 
matter, whereas Bradley, in antithesis to the Hume-Mill 
theory, typifies the idealistic trend.
It is a matter of historical interest, that so far as 
the deterministic notion of free-will is concerned, there 
is a gradual transition of thought, from Hume and Mill to 
Bradley, which in every new stage is supplemented by the 
emergence of a new additional idea. Bradley is the
11
culmination of the deterministic trend, though his 
determinism is different from that of Hume and Mill.
In the conclusion, I have tried to evaluate these 
views and to find out their respective merits. No attempt 
has been made to reach a positive conclusion. This is 
because of the nature of philosophy itself. The nature of 
philosophy is more close to an attitude, than to a subject 
with fixed laws, premises and conclusions. The question of 
reaching a conclusion is not very significant here. The 
philosophical problems require proper treatment, rather 
than any claim to ultimate solution.
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CHAPTER I
DAVID HUME
Among the philosophers of the 17th and 18th centuries, 
Hume seems surprisingly contemporary with us, both in 
philosophical outlook and analytical thinking.
Hume was the pioneer philosopher who gave a thorough 
empirical treatment to the notions of freedom and 
predictability with a view to reconciling them both. It is 
true that a more or less similar line of thought is 
observable in a few other philosophers who were predecessors 
of Hume, and it is not very difficult to trace back the 
source of his theory of freedom in their writings.
Hume seems to be very much influenced by the ideas 
of Hobbes, Descartes, Spinoza, Collins and others# His title
O s/ ,
’On Liberty and Necessity' is^reminiscent of HobbeS s 
elaborate discussion with Bishop Bramhall on "The Question 
Concerning Liberty, Necessity and C h a n c e " H o b b e s  
discussed the point from almost the same point of view as 
Hume does. In this essay, Hobbes remarked, "the distinction 
of free in to free from compulsion, and free from 
necessitation I acknowledge. For, to be free from compulsion 
is to do a thing so as terror be not the cause of his will 
to do it.... But free from necessitation, I say no man can
1, The English Works of Thomas Hobbes: Edt. Sir W.M.Bart: 
Vol.V. 1859-45.
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be and it is that which his lordship undertook to disprove."^
Similarly, in Hume, we find a distinction between 
freedom from compulsion and freedom from necessitation 
which he calls respectively freedom of spontaneity and 
freedom of indifference.
With reference to his predecessors, what Hume wrote 
concerning liberty and necessity, is not absolutely 
extraordinary, but his novelty lies in putting the whole 
controversy in a new light by giving a new definition of 
causal necessity. Hume for the first time points out that 
the whole controversy of freedom "has hitherto turned merely 
upon words." It arises from the ambiguous meanings of the 
terms used, and once the proper meanings are understood, 
the problem becomes what in the twentieth century has been 
called a pseudo-problem.
In considering Hume's theory of freedom, I should 
like to begin with a very brief sketch of his philosophical 
position for two reasons:
(1) First, a philosopher should be judged in his own 
terminological context which inevitably follows from his 
philosophical position. More or less, each philosopher has 
his own set of terms and meanings, especially suitable for 
the development of his premises. Unless we know these
lo Ibid., p.248, Wo.XIX.
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premises and assumptions, it is difficult to grasp what 
exactly he wants to say.
Hume has used words and terms in a very special 
sense, in the context of the problem of freedom. He has 
adopted a terminology quite appropriate for his empirical 
treatment. Hence, a retrospection of his philosophical 
position will help us to understand the reason for such 
specification of the meanings of words used.
(2) Second, in Hume's philosophy particularly, the idea of 
liberty is closely connected with the ideas of necessity 
and causality. These two ideas form the nucleus of Hume*a 
philosophy, where they stand for definite meanings, 
peculiar to Hume himself and suitable for his main thesis. 
Speaking truly, Hume is more concerned with the idea of 
necessity than that of liberty. Both in "A Treatise of 
Human Nature",^ and "Enquiries Concerning Human
p
Understanding", he has given considerable attention to the 
treatment of the idea of necessity. In the "Treatise", the 
essay on liberty and necessity appears under the general 
heading of "The will and direct passion". Later, in the 
"Enq-'JLiry", it supplements the chapter on necessary connection, 
and the relation between the two becomes more prominent and 
closer than in the "Treatise".
1. A^Treatise of Human Nature: D.Hume: Edt.L.A.Sell^y-Bigge,
2. Enquiries concerning Human Understanding: D.Hume, Edt.
L.A.Selby -Bigge; 1902 (Second ed.)
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Therefore, unless we know the proper implications of 
the principle of necessity as enunciated by Hume, we cannot 
expect a true understanding of his theory of liberty; and 
an understanding of the principle of necessity means going 
back to his philosophical position.
It is a legitimate question to ask why Hume feels an 
urge for the specification of the meanings of terms used in 
connection with the problem of freedom? The answer to this 
question lies in his philosophy as a whole.
Being a successor of the empirical trend of thought 
as introduced by Locke and others, Hume finds it inevitable 
to sacrifice the old rationalistic conception of cause, i.e. 
the cause  ^ being a power, generates the effect and the 
relation between the two is a necessary relation. Hume's 
sole desire is to explain the concept of causality in terms 
of experience. His consistent empiricism demands a 
restriction of the meanings of the terms used in this 
context.
It would be a mistake if one thinks that Hume denies 
the causal relation as such. All that he wants, is to find 
out precisely what it is.
Hume says that the idea of causal connection is
16
derived from relations among objects, and these relations 
are those of contiguity, succession and necessary connection. 
Hume admits that although contiguity and succession are two 
factors involved in the idea of causal relation, they are 
only of secondary importance. "There is a necessary 
connection to be taken into consideration; and that 
relation is of much greater importance, than any of the 
other two above-mentioned."^
This shows that from the very beginning, Hume regards 
necessary connection as an essential factor of the notion of 
causation, and then he proceeds to explore its meaning. If 
we have an idea of necessary connection, then corresponding 
to that idea, there must be either an impression of 
sensation or of reflection, as all ideas, for Hume, are 
ultimately derived from impressions.
This attempt to find out the corresponding impression 
of the idea of necessity is proved indirectly. First of all, 
he tries to show that the so-called causal relation consists 
of nothing but a relation of constant conjunction between 
two objects, and then he claims that, since, this idea of 
constant conjunction cannot furnish us the idea of necessity 
the idea of necessity must be a determination of the mind.
Hume thinks that the principle of universal causation
1. Treatise, Bk,I, P.Ill, GeCi2. p.77.
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i.e. why every event should have a cause and why a 
particular cause must have a particular effect, is neither 
intuitively certain, nor demonstrable.^ Its only support 
comes from experience. All that we get from experience is 
nothing but the order of contiguity and succession between 
two objects. The repetition of this order gives rise to a 
new relation. This is the constant conjunction between two 
objects. This experience of constant conjunction produces 
a sense of connection in our mind, which we designate as 
causal connection. One instance is not sufficient for this 
purpose, but several instances are necessary where the 
relations of contiguity and succession are preserved.
"The first time a man saw the communication of motion 
by impulse, as by the shock of two billiard balls, he could 
not pronounce that the one event was connected: but only 
that itwds conjoined with the other. After he has observed 
several instances of this nature, he then pronounces them
p
to be connected."
The only alteration which has taken place is :
"Nothing but that he now feels these events to be connected 
in his imagination, and can readily fo^tell the existence 
of one from the appearance of the other.
1. Ibid., Seco3î p.79,
2. Enquiry Sec.VII Part 2. p.75»
3. Ibid., p.76.
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The notions of cause and effect, thus entirely depend 
upon the idea of constant conjunction. But from this idea of 
constant conjunction, it is not possible to derive the idea 
of necessary relation.
"From the mere repetition of any past impression, 
even to infinity, there never will arise any new original 
idea, such as that of a necessary connection, and the 
number of impressions has in this case no more effect than 
if we confined ourselves to one only."^
This is true not only of the impressions of sensation 
but also of reflection.."The will being here considered as 
a cause, has no more a discoverable connection with its 
effects, than any material cause has with its proper effect... 
The actions of the mind are, in this respect, the same with 
those of matter. We perceive only their constant conjunctions; 
nor can we ever reason beyond it. No internal impression
2
has an apparent energy more than external objects have."
If the idea of necessary connection is derived neither 
from the impression of sensation, nor from that of 
reflection, then there cannot be such an idea. But Hume has 
already accepted the idea of necessary relation as an 
essential point in the notion of causation. Hence, in order 
to save the situation, he says that although there is no
1. Treatise, Bk.I. P.3. Sec.VI. p.88.
2. Ibid., Appendix, pp.632-5.
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impression as such, corresponding to the idea of necessary 
connection, we have it in the form of psychological 
determination on 'bustom-bred-expectation,"
Hume compares the idea of necessity with "propensity" 
which custom produces^' to pass from an object to the idea of 
its usual attendant,"^ All that the human mind can discover 
by experience is nothing but a series of constant 
conjunctions between two objects or entities. On the basis of 
these constant conjunctions mind imagines that there is a 
necessary connection and infers the existence of one 
whenever it sees the other. Hence, if there is any necessity 
it comes from the mind of the observer; necessity does not 
lie in the nature of objects.
Thus, Hume denies the idea of necessity as an 
internal connection which can never be otherwise, and 
analyses its meaning into mere subjective determination.
This, Hume has done in order to remain consistent with his 
empirical philosophy. His phenomenalism, so long consistent, 
cannot allow any other sense of necessity except that of 
psychological determination.
It is quite interesting to note that although Hume 
denies the rationalistic implication of the term 'necessity* 
he does not abandon the term itself. It would be less
1. Ibid., Bk.I, P.3, Sec.XIV, p.16?.
20
ambiguous if he would have used the phrase ’determination 
of the mind’, or something like that, instead of ’Necessity*, 
because that was all he wanted to mean by the term 
’necessity’. But the continuous use of the term 'necessity* 
often gives rise to a false impression of Hume’s doctrine.
The same ambiguity of language is present in the 
’Treatise’ as well as in the ’Enquiry *. For instance in 
Sec.VII, P.I, p.82, of the ’Enquiry’, where he says that 
necessity is observable in the operations of the material 
objects, he makes use of the phrase ’’Determination by the 
energy of its cause’’. This shows that he is not free from 
the tendency to believe in causal energy or power* which 
elsewhere he denies.
Hume’s idea of liberty is derived from this 
conception of necessity. His theory of liberty consists 
mainly in showing the operation of the principle of
necessity in the case of human behaviour.
Hume seems to be very much impressed by the constancy 
of relations observed among physical objects. It is his 
view that to discuss the problem of liberty and necessity, 
one should start not from one's experience of soul and will, 
but of matter, Hume seems to have two oppositions in his 
mind. First, he wants to make clear a position which could
21
almost be described as materialistic and which conceives a 
necessary relation between two physical objects designated 
as cause and effect, Hume wants to show that from an 
empirical perspective it is not possible to perceive any 
necessary relation between two physical objects except that 
of constant conjunction. Secondly, he argues against the 
philosophers who failing to find out such a necessary 
relation between motive aixd action, form a conception of 
freedom of will. Hume points out very aptly that the idea 
of constant conjunction, which is equally present both in 
physical objects and voluntary actions, and which has 
become the ground for the formulation of physical necessity 
should also be a ground for the formation of the idea of 
mental necessity. Hume starts with matter, because the idea 
of necessity is easy to comprehend in the case of physical 
relations. In the physical world, in the operation of the 
bodies, no trace of liberty or indifference could be found. 
They are always governed by the principle of causal 
regularity or necessity.
Hume’s formula for detecting necessity is to find 
out the presence of two factors, viso, .4the constant union 
and the inference of the mind; and wherever we discover 
these, we must acknowledge a necessity."^
In the case of voluntary actions the same factors
1. Treatise, Bk.Ii, P.3. Sec.I, p.400.
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are detectable too. Our actions have a constant union with 
our motives and tempers. We always act on the basis of this 
constancy. Evidences can be shown from History, from the 
sameness of human nature and from the universality of 
motives and feelings. Since, one factor, constancy is present, 
it is also expected that another factor viz. the inference 
made by the mind, should also be present, and, as a matter 
of fact, it is present. The constant conjunction between 
motive and action does influence us to infer the existence 
of one from that of another, as it does in any physical 
operation. Whether in History, Politics or Morals, we 
always act on the basis of these two factors.
Hence, the relation between our motive and action is 
as necessary, as the causal relation between two physical 
objects. Prom this, Hume draws the conclusion that there is 
nothing like liberty or indifference in voluntary action.
All human actions necessarily follow from their antecedents 
and if there is any irregular action, it is due to the 
secret operation of a concealed cause which the observer 
fails to noticeo
Thus analysing the meanings of the terms ’necessity* 
and ’liberty*, Hume declares that the problem of free-will 
arises from the ambiguity of the words used. Hume * s hope is 
to clarify the issue by his own. terminology, according to 
which,
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,/'Necessity makes an essential part of causation and 
consequently liberty, by removing necessity, removes all 
causes, and is the very same thing with chance. As chance is 
commonly thought to imply a contradiction, and is at least 
directly contrary to experience, there are always the same 
arguments against liberty or free-will."^ Hume is quite 
consistent so far as this terminology is concerned. It 
appears from what he says that there are two aspects of a 
causal situation; (1) the objective aspect consists of the 
constant conjunction of entities independent of any 
subjective determination, and (2) the subjective aspect 
consists of the determination of the mind which leads to 
the expectation of a future constancy between two entities 
already observed to be conjoined# By necessity, Hume means 
this subjective determination of the mind. On the other 
hand, by liberty Hume means freedom from necessity and, 
therefore, when it j.s allowed, it removes both necessity and 
causality, and becomes equivalent to chance.
When Hume says that liberty removes necessity, all 
that he should mean is the removal of the subjective aspect 
of causality viz. the determination of the mind# The 
objective aspect, viz., the regular sequence between two 
events known as cause and effect, remains as it is, and is 
not a bit shattered by the removal of necessity. This happens.
1. Treatise, Bk»II, P.3, Seed, p.407.
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because the necessity which Hume conceives is only a 
necessity of our subjective world, - a device of our 
language. But in the non-mental objective world, there is no 
such necessity.
For Hume, the events which lack this subjective 
determination are accidents. But when considered objectively, 
either all events are accidents or they are not. They can 
be called accidents because none of them is causally 
connected, since, causal connection is a mere psychological 
determination. Again, they cannot be called accidents, 
because none of them lack the relations of contiguity and 
succession, from which the idea of causal necessity is 
derived. If they are regularly contiguous and successive, 
they may remain so independent of our expectation. When 
considered subjectively, they appear quite different. The 
events which have been observed repeatedly, do not appear 
as accidents because, in their case the mental expectancy 
is already formed. But the events which unfortunately could 
not give rise to such mental expectancy by being objects 
of repeated observation, are known as accidents. Ofcourse, 
all these accidental events are mere negation for Hume. He 
does not allow the existence of accidents. Even where events 
appear to be accidental, they are actually due to the 
operation of some concealed causes. But explanation of facts 
with references to the concealed causes is rather a negative
25
device. It means explanation in terms of terms nnkno-wn. So 
long as one does not show that there are real causes behind 
such phenomena, it is no good saying that they are due to 
concealed causes. It adds nothing to one's argument. Hume's 
contention,however, is that there is nothing like chance or 
accident in the world of events - physical or mental*
Every event is caused in the regularity sense* Either we 
do experience this régulaiity or do not. Where we 
experience it, we imagine and expect a future repetition, 
and this is all that is meant hy necessity in Humean 
Terminology.
Quite clearly, Hume is making a distinction between 
logical necessity and necessity formed from the sense of 
regularity. In the former sense, it cannot but be, but in 
the latter sense, it is just a mental expection* Hence, to 
come back to our point, removal of this mental expectation 
does not in any way mean the removal of the regular sequence 
of events. For the latter in no way depends on the former. 
Nor does it mean a total looseness from the causal nexus.
It appears, that when Hume says that liberty removes 
necessity, he unconsciously means not only this subjective 
expectation, but also the objective regularity of events 
and that is why by "liberty from necessity" he means an 
indifference or a chance.
It is true that if there is no such expectation of
26
the mind for the constant conjunction of events in future, 
then it will no more he possible to go beyond the evidences 
of the senses. Such expectation produces a belief on the 
basis of which we can make inferences. But Hume cannot 
avoid this situation even if he retains necessity in the 
sense of subjective determination, and causality in the 
sense of regularity. The moment he has denied the logical 
necessity in causal situation, the door for probability is 
opened. No amount of the expectation of mind arising from 
the experience of regular sequence, can furnish the 
sufficient ground for the inference of the future from the 
past. There are both uniformities as well as non-uniformities 
in the experiences of the past, and moreover the proportion 
of the observed uniformities is so small in comparison with 
the vast and yet unknown regions of nature, that no 
universal absolute generalisation is possible from that 
experience.
It may be pointed out that the belief in the 
existence of the physical world, is, according to Hume, a 
belief constructed from these observed unities and 
regularities by the determination of the mind. If this 
determination is destroyed, and the sense of regularity with 
it, the idea of the entire physical world will be destroyed.
But if a belief in the external world is a 
composition of the mind, then the observed regularity is also
27
a composition of the mind. The regularity or the uniformity 
exists only for a mind which observes them. On the other 
hand, Hume thinks that the objects and events are in 
themselves discrete and separate from each other* The 
discreteness and the separateness are experienced by the 
same mine which has experienced the regularity of objects. 
Otherwise, one cannot know these two characteristics of 
objects. Hence, both discreteness as well as regularity are 
experiences of the mind. Sometimes experience reveals the 
'looseness' of the objects, sometimes their regularity.
This shows that even if the sense of regularity is 
destroyed, together with the determination of the mind, 
the idea of the physical world will not be destroyed. In 
the absence of regularity, we can have an idea of a 
physical world which will contain discrete and isolated 
entities. In arguing against liberty, Hume rejects all 
sorts of immediate feeling of liberty. In the 'Treatise',^
p
as well as in the 'Enquiry', he mentions three sources of 
the origin of the idea of liberty. These are:
(1) The reluctance to believe that we are governed by 
necessity.
(2) The false sensation of liberty which we have in our
mind, and,
lo Treatise: Bk.II. Sec.II. pp.407-408.
2. Enquiry : Sec.VIII. P.I, 72, p.92.
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(5)' The belief that without it religion and morality will 
be impossible.
1,. As to the first, such reluctance arises from the 
fact that men believe strongly that in the case of the 
physical objects, "they perceive something like a necessary 
connection between cause and effect." But in the operations 
of their own mind, "they feel no such connection of motive 
and action"; from this they conclude that there is a 
difference between the effects which result from material 
force and those which arise from thought and intelligence.
The type of necessity which Hume means here, is 
that which cannot but be, and the assumption which he makes 
here, is that the absence of this type is easily 
detectable in the case of motive and action. It is 
interesting to note that when Hume wants to deny logical 
necessity, he starts with the mind. But when he wants to 
assert necessity in the sense of regularity, he starts with 
the matter. The argument suggests, as if one can detect the 
presence of logical necessity in the case of matter. But 
that there could be a logical necessity in the case of 
matter, is totally rejected by Hume in the ‘Enquiry*. The 
necessity, neither regular, nor logical, is easily 
discernible in the case of mental behaviour. Although the 
sense of regularity, on which Hume's idea of necessity is
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based, is acknowledged by ordinary people including the 
'poor artificer' of Hume who works on the assumption of 
this regularity between motive and action, yet the naive 
man does not bother much with the presence or absence of 
necessity of any type. This is, because sometimes we do act 
regularly* sometimes do not. The past regularity itself 
may be a cause of future deviation. All that a man does is thai 
after discovering the regular sequence of physical objects, 
he anthropomorphically ascribes an element of compulsion to 
them, which he does not feel in his own case, and concludes 
accordingly, that his will is free and not governed by 
necessity. The reluctance comes from the absence of 
compulsion, not from the absence of logical necessity.
A. Flew, in his "Hume's Philosophy of Belief" 
remarks that the force of this argument "is considerably 
diminished by his failure ever to distinguish, explicitly 
between the sense of necessary connection in which he is 
denying the subsistence of such connections and the sense 
in which he is committed to affirming them.
Such confusions between two senses of the term 
necessity - one the regularity sense in which Hume accepts 
it, and the other, the logical sense in which Hume denies 
it, arises from his reluctance to give up the term
1. A^Flew: Hume's Philosophy of Belief : Ch.VII, p.150,
1961.
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'necessity'. He wants to keep it in a specified sense which 
is completely different from its usual meaning. As a result, 
as A.Flew points "out, "even if people feel no such connection 
of motive and action, they surely do at least feel a 
connection (in that other sense)...."
2. The second source of the origin of the idea of 
freedom is a false sensation. Hume calls the idea of liberty 
a 'false' and 'seeming' idea. He says -^ in our reflections 
or in performing action we are sensible of some looseness or 
difference.*'We feel that our actions are subject to our 
will"and imagine**'that the will itself is subject to 
nothing*
We have already seen, that the sensation of 
'looseness' is nothing but an experience just like the 
sensation of 'regularity'. If the experience of regularity 
is not a seeming experience, the experience of 'looseness' 
should not be a 'seeming' one. Moreover, even if we accept 
Hume's statement that, "we imagine, the will itself is 
subject to nothing", what we actually imagine is, not that 
the will is uncaused, but that it is free from compulsion, 
and as such it has no antagonism with what Hume wants to 
prove. Here, Hume misreads the 'naive' imagination.
1. Ibid., p.151.
2. Treatise, Bk.II, Sc.II, P.Ill, p.408.
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It is not very clear what Hume actually wants to 
mean hy calling liberty a 'false idea'. Is it a false idea 
in the same sense in which the idea of logical necessity, 
when applied to facts and events, is? Even the idea of 
necessity, when taken in the regularity sense, is not in a 
better position than the idea of liberty. Both of them 
occupy the same status in the process of experience. Both 
are equally derived from experience - one from the 
experience of regularity in the sequence of events, and 
another from the experience of 'looseness* or 'indifference* 
More precisely both are imaginations of the mind inspired 
by the data of experience. In one case, mind imagines a 
necessary relation and proceeds according to that, and in 
another case, mind imagines a sense of freedom and works 
according to that. As both these ideas are from incomplete 
observation, they are equally probable. They equally share 
the possibility of becoming a seeming experience in future. 
The only criterion which Hume, as an empiricist, has to 
judge the validity of the idea of liberty, is the criterion 
of experience. But experience fails to uphold the superior 
claim of the idea of necessity over the idea of liberty.
Hume says that the idea of liberty is a false idea, 
is evident from the following fact;
Every action can be studied in two ways : -
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(a) by an agent and (b) by an observer. As an agent, one 
feels something like liberty, yet as an observer, one can 
easily see that the action is necessarily connected with 
and can be inferred from its preceding motives, dispositions 
etc.
It is rather strange that in all other cases of 
mental feelings one is supposed to be one's own best judge, 
except in this case of the feeling of so-called liberty.
For instance, in the case of necessary relation, there is 
no necessary connection in the physical world, though one 
feels like that; again, in the case of liberty of 
spontaneity, one feels that there is no inner or outer 
compulsion. In all these cases what one feels is taken for 
granted, except in the case of the feeling of 'looseness* 
or 'indifference' in our actions.
Hume says that the causal regularity, if there 
is any, is not a quality present in the mind or the matter 
concerned, but belongs to the mind of the observer who may or 
may not be the agent. It consists of an inference made by 
the observer from the antecedent motives to the subsequent 
actions. Moreover, in the context of a particular motive, 
the observer is bound to infer a particular action. 
Determination enters in this way. Even if the observer fails 
to infer correctly, the failure does not mean that the
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action has occurred hy sheer chance. It is either due to a 
concealed cause or due to the failure of the observer to 
assess the situational conditions properly. This shows that 
all our actions are determined and not free in the sense of 
freedom from necessity, "and whatever capricious and 
irregular actions we may perform; as the desire of showing 
our liberty is the sole motive of our actions, we can never 
free ourselves from the bonds of necessity."
There is no dispute, so far Hume wants to mean that 
all our actions are necessarily connected in a regular 
sequence with our motives and dispositions. But a problem 
arises when Hume claims that from the knowledge of these 
antecedents, the actions are in principle, predictable.
Causal determinism, for Hume, means predictability. The 
condition of such prediction is that one has to know the 
antecedents exhaustively and accurately in every detail.
This hypothetical claim is the main argument of Hume in 
favour of prediction.
If Hume can show that the conditions preceding a 
particular action are both 'in principle* as well as 'in 
fact' knowable, then his claim would be valid one. On the 
other hand, to invalidate Hume’s claim one has to show that 
these conditions are both 'in fact' as well as 'in principle'
1. Treatise; Bk.II. P.5* Sec.II. p.408.
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unknowable. Not only that we do not know them, but also 
that we cannot know them. To prove that we cannot know them, 
is to prove that it is logically impossible to know them.
Hume's claim rests on the principle of mechanical 
causation. It was his desire to make a Newtonian science of 
human nature. According to mechanical determinism, the 
events and the objects of the universe are mechanically 
determined consequences, which are predictable from their 
antecedents with reference to some universal laws of nature. 
These physical events and objects are isolated and discrete, 
and static enough to be brought under some universal laws 
of nature. Hume considers mental events as isolated and 
discrete, and also believes that the generalization of their 
abstract characters is possible. Hence, quite logically, 
if one knows the conditions, one can predict the mental 
events. But there are certain basic differences between 
human motives and actions, and physical states or events.
It is very doubtful whether the application of the principle 
of mechanical causation in the case of motive and action is 
not a category-mistake. Universal laws, like the laws of 
nature, in virtue of which we can predict a human action 
from its antecedent motives, are not easily obtainable. 
Psychical events - motives and dispositions are too complex 
to be generalized. Moreover, they are so interwoven, that
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one cannot be abstracted from the others. The mechanical 
precision obtainable in the case of isolated physical events 
are completely lacking here. Because the mental events form 
a sort of unity from which it is not possible to isolate one 
single motive or action, nor are they mutually comparable 
and repetitive by nature. All these factors stand in the 
way of generalization. But unless there are such established 
general laws of mind, as laws of nature, prediction becomes 
impossible.
From the standpoint of Hume's psychological atomism, 
there is nothing logically wrong in saying that human 
actions are in principle predictable, but unless we can in 
fact make such predictions we cannot call it a valid 
principle. The idea of logical possibility becomes an empty 
idea, when it is not actually possible. We may have a logical 
principle, but we must have a practical principle to judge 
what is practically impossible and what is not. This is 
equivalent to saying that so long as the prediction is not 
verified, we cannot be certain that we have known all the 
relevant conditions determining the action. The causal 
connection is revealed completely only when what is 
predicted is actualised. It is only then we can know which 
of the conditions are necessary and which are not.
This happens because prediction always refers to the 
future. In future, there is always an openness for
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possibilities. What has not yet happened, can be prevented 
or altered by the alteration of the conditions* But this is 
not the case with the past. What has already happened 
cannot now be otherwise. Here events are more or less fixed 
and stable. It is easy to look back and account for an event. 
Since there is an openness of possibilities in future, all 
that one can do is to say what are the possible results of 
a given cause. But one cannot accurately foretell which 
particular result or effect will follow.
The factor^ which sometimes brings change in the 
conditions and thus makes it impossible to know them 
exhaustively, is the gap of time between prediction and 
the actualisation of the action. However brief and 
insignificant it may be, during this time-gap the situation 
may change. The subtle changes which may occur within this 
short period, are not easy to comprehend. In Hume's 
philosophy, this time-factor is not negligible, as the cause 
is always prior to the effect in time. Due to this time 
factor, the nature of the causal conditions always remains 
uncertain and difficult to be apprehended exhaustively.
The number of the conditions is another factor which 
often intervenes with their exhaustive knowledge. In order 
to make a certain prediction, one has to ascertain accurately 
that all positive conditions, which are necessary for the
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occurrence of the action, are present, as well as all 
negative conditions which can hinder the occurrence, are 
absent, i.e. one has to know an infinite number of 
conditions, which is simply physically impossible to know.
There is another difficulty which is peculiar to 
human actions only. The prediction of an action can itself 
be a factor for the determination of the occurrence or non­
occurrence of the action, e.g. on hearing the prediction 
that I shall vote for Labour, I may or may not change my 
mind.
It is true that in some cases, we can predict human 
action. But such cases are so limited in comparison with the 
number of cases where we cannot, that no generalization is 
possible. It is possible only so far as our experience goes. 
We cannot predict where the results are absolutely unknown. 
Where causes are permanent and static, and a sense of 
regularity is already formed, prediction is possible. But 
even there because of the factors mentioned before, one 
cannot be certain about the predicted result. Knowledge of 
the causal conditions can lead only to different degrees of 
probability, but not to absolute certainty. This is 
particularly true of all sorts of creative activity. They 
are causally determined, but at the same time, do not 
follow in a regular sequence from the preceding conditions. 
They are determined without being predictable.
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All these show that Hume's hypothetical claim that 
human action is in principle predictable, is only an empty 
claim leading to innumerable difficulties in practice.
Even if it is allowed that it is possible to know 
the causal conditions accurately, there is another difficulty 
concealed in the idea of the liberty of spontaneity as 
formulated by Hume.
After showing that the liberty of indifference, being 
opposite to causal necessity, is a myth, Hume says that the 
only sense in which freedom can be allowed, is the liberty 
of spontaneity which is freedom from compulsion or 
constraint. By calling it 'spontaneous' Hume means that it 
springs from one's own inclinations and tendencies, Hume 
calls this a hypothetical liberty consisting of the power 
of acting or not-acting according to the determinations of 
our will. Liberty does not consist for Hume in making a 
choice between two or more alternatives, but it is an 
ability to act as one wishes. In this sense only, liberty 
is compatible with determinism and consistent with the idea 
of necessity.
There is nothing to dispute with this primary sense 
of liberty. It is true, that I can act, or not, according to 
my own determinations, and thus enjoy the liberty of 
spontaneity, while my action is fully caused by its
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antecedent conditions. But the idea of the liberty of 
spontaneity is not as simple as Hume makes it appear to be, 
and it is doubtful how far the distinction between the 
liberty of spontaneity and the liberty of indifference can 
be maintained.
What Hume wants to mean by liberty of spontaneity is 
that, if I choose to remain at rest, I may, or if I choose
to move, I also may. This, he says, is universally allowed
to all, who is not a prisoner or in chains. This means that
if I move, the cause of my movement is my choosing to move.
That is, my choice is the determining cause of my movements. 
In Hume's theory of causal regularity there is no break. 
Hence, my choice is equally caused by some other mental 
factors, like 'I have chosen to choose to be at rest', or 
some non-mental factors like circumstances, environment, 
heredity, etc. The difficulty with Hume is this; in speaking 
of liberty of spontaneity, he does not go beyond the 
jurisdiction of conscious motives. But our motives can be 
traced back to external as well as internal factors which 
are ultimately beyond our control. When these factors are 
given, a particular action of mine must follow necessarily, 
and no question of my "choosing to remain at rest or to 
move" arises. Under the given circumstances, the action 
must follow, or I have so to choose, whatever it may be.
A,Flew says that from this it does not follow that I
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could not have decided otherwise. I could, had some one 
given me good reasons.^ This claim actually suggests an 
alteration of the antecedent conditions when some one gives 
me 'good reasons' in favour of doing otherwise, it may lead 
to a change of my psychological or physiological conditions 
which will make me to do otherwise. But Hume believes in 
predictability which demands a constancy of the causal 
conditions. Prediction is possible only when conditions are 
static and stable enough. Hence, the alteration of the 
precedent conditions which Flew suggests, is not possible in 
Hume's theory.
Moreover, "I could have done otherwise, if I had 
chosen" - this statement is meaningless in the context of 
Hume's theory. To know the conditions exhaustively, is 
to know that there can be only one possible effect of these 
conditions. There cannot be room for any other result or 
any chance of the action being otherwise. The person who 
acts under such conditions, is not a 'free' person; he 
cannot do otherwise even if he is free from compulsion.
Freedom, for Hume, means a feeling of non-coercion.
I can move my hand this way or that way, and nobody compels 
me in doing that. This feeling of non-coercion is felt by 
me. I am the agent here. But what is the guarantee that my
1. A.Flew: Hume's Philosophy of Belief, Ch.VII, p.156.
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feeling is not a "seeming idea" of a pseudo-liberty? That 
I am not a reliable judge, Hume has proved in the case of 
liberty of indifference* where I feel a sense of 'looseness*. 
Similarly, the feeling of non-compulsion may be a seeming 
experience. It is quite possible that there is an inner 
compulsion which I am not conscious of* Instead of external 
coercion, there may be psychological coercion, such as 
persuasion, suggestion etc., which are really beyond our 
control. Moreover, with the advance of psychological and 
physiological knowledge, the possibility of an action's 
being otherwise gradually diminishes.
This shows, that in the background of his conception 
of causal regularity, what Hume calls the liberty of 
spontaneity, when analyzed properly, either leads to strong 
determinism and is not freedom at all, or if we want to make 
it freedom proper, it becomes equivalent to freedom of 
indifference.
5. As to the third: according to Hume, the idea of 
liberty arises from a common belief that the ascription of 
moral responsibility demands freedom of action. Unless a 
man is free to act, he cannot be held responsible for his 
action. Hume argues that far from being incompatible with 
determinism, moral responsibility demands it; i.e. the ideas 
of liberty and necessity, in the restricted sense prescribed
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by Hume, are indispensable for morality and religion. This 
view has influenced many of the later philosophers who have 
developed and elaborated it in their own way.
Hume says, if freedom means freedom from necessity, 
then free actions are non-caused actions without any link 
with the motive, dispositions and nature of the agent. 
Hence, he should not be held responsible for them. If so, 
then "it would be impossible to praise or blame, to punish 
or reward a man, because it would be connected with nothing 
permanent in his nature."
What Hume wants to suggest is that, in order to call 
a person morally responsible, (a) all his actions must be 
causally linked with his motives, dispositions, and 
character, and (b) he must remain the same person.
If these two suppositions are denied, then "a man is 
as pure and untainted, after having committed the most 
horrid crime, as at the first moment of his birth." The 
third suggestion is that (c) like the laws of nature, there 
are laws of mind stating in universal terms that similar 
motives have similar and uniform effects on the mind, in 
similar circumstances. So far as the first suggestion is 
concerned, Hume makes a confusion between ’having a cause* 
and ’being in character*. It is true, that every action 
has a set of sufficient conditions in the sense that it is
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caused by them. But it is not essentially true that action 
should always be linked up with the character-traits of the 
agent. For instance, a truly honest man can deceive a person, 
a thief can check his temptation. Such actions cannot be 
predicted from the established character of the person 
involved, although it may be easy to account for them, to 
give sufficient reasons.
Hume says that "the action is caused" means "it is 
always connected with a motive in our mind", and hence in 
that sense necessary. When we act capriciously in order to 
show our freedom of action, there also is a motive which is 
motive for the display of our freedom. If we take 'motive* 
in the literal sense, it is doubtful how far we can say 
that all our actions have antecedent motives. There are 
actions which we perform without any definite motive or 
intention, e.g. accidentally I shoot a man without the 
least intention of killing him.
The second suggestion is clearly incompatible with 
Hume's notion of personal identity. It suggests the idea of 
permanent self underlying the 'perishing* actions, which is 
most uncommon in Humean philosophy. According to Hume, a 
person is nothing but a bundle of different perceptions in 
a constant state of change. It is not necessary to have any
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permanent element in order to call a person the same person.
The idea of a permanent self is a confusion between two 
ideas of diversity and identity. The identity of the self 
or mind is fictitious for Hume. They lack any constant 
character. Moreover, it is not absolutely necessary that in 
order to blame or reward a person he must have something 
permanent in his nature. In practice, we often blame people 
for actions which are not linked with their permanent nature. 
For instance, when an honest man steals once in his life, 
for the first time. That incident has no connection with 
his permanent nature, nor is he the same person which he 
was before, or will be afterwards. Still we blame him for 
what he did. Hence, the permanent character of the self is 
not essential for reward or punishment. Hume could have 
shown this quite easily, but in his zeal of applying the 
principle of necessity to human action, he contradicts his 
own theory of personal identity. So far as the third suggestion 
is concerned, no generalisation of mental behaviour is possible
Hume himself raises certain objections against his 
theory, but fails to answer them properly.
Hume realises that his principle of necessity leads 
to a position where the "ultimate author of all our 
volitions" is God, "who first bestowed motion on this j
immense machine, and placed all beings in that particular 
position, whence every subsequent event, by an inevitable
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necessity must r e s u l t . T h i s  objection, according to Hume 
consists of two parts:
(a) "that if human actions can be traced up ,by a necessary 
chain,to the Deity, they can never be criminal", and
(b) if they are criminal, God is the ultimate author of 
guilt.
The answer to this objection, which Hume tries to 
give is neither sufficient, nor plausible enough. To speak 
candidly it is no answer at all. In his eloquent language, 
he poses an answer but he himself is quite conscious of its 
inadequacy. He fails to reconcile his principle of necessity 
with these theological questions. His first answer is stoic 
in character - that everything good and evil, is good as an 
element in the whole, and in the long run. But he also 
admits that "though this topic is specious and sublime, it 
was soon found in practice weak and ineffectual."
His second answer is an admission - admission of the 
philosopher's inability to solve how "God can be the cause 
of all actions without being the author of moral evil."
Hume is a bit ironical here. Many of the later critics have 
considered this last argument of Hume's theory of liberty 
and necessity as the weakest one. They have tried to show 
that Hume has failed to answer the question properly.
1. Enquiry, Sec.VIII, P.II, 78, p.100.
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But Hume is more interested in sh.ow3.ng the efficacy 
of causal principle in the case of human action, than in 
theological speculations. He admits, that as a philosopher 
his "true province" is "the examination of common life", 
and he remains satisfied with its difficulties.
After considering all these arguments we are left 
with one point, viz. that the problem of liberty is, as 
Hume calls it, a verbal problem. For Hume, the problem 
centres round the meanings of the terms used and it can be 
solved by a consideration of these meanings and implications* 
The problem rests on a misconception of the natures of 
liberty and necessity and once the misconception is 
corrected the problem becomes unreal.
Hume seems to be wrong in his estimation of the 
problem, and his difficulty arises from this wrong estimation. 
In every philosophical problem one has to use concepts which 
need clarification. Analysis of these concepts gives rise 
to certain amount of verbal explanation. It involves 
elimination of verbal ambiguities, specification of the 
conceptual meanings etc. Every philosophical problem is 
verbal from this poin.t of view. But this does not mean that 
they are essentially verbal and therefore at bottom, no 
problem at all. It is a general and misleading tendency to
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regard all conceptual problems as verbal and therefore 
'pseudo*.
The point is this, that in spite of his clarification 
of the meanings of the terms used, Hume is far from the 
solution of the problem. He is right so far as he points 
out that if an action does not causally follow from previous 
motive and disposition, it will be equivalent to chance, and 
this is not the freedom what is demanded by moral 
responsibility. Hence, if anyone thinks that free-will 
means freedom from causal continuity, then it is a pseudo­
problem.
But the notion of moral responsibility not only 
demands that the action must causally follow from the 
'character' of the person, but also that 'the action could 
have been otherwise'• The Humean empiricism with its causal 
regularity finds difficulty to tackle with this last factor. 
In Humean philosophy, since there is an unbreakable causal 
continuity, the action could never be otherwise. Although 
Hume always insists that his idea of necessity is necessity 
in its lowest degree, i.e. a mere expectation based on 
regularity, but in practice, he always uses the term in its 
strongest sense leaving no room for an uncaused event - or 
an event's being otherwise. Hence, by calling the problem 
verbal, he has, indirectly chosen one of the two extremes 
which he wants to reconcile. He moulds the problem in his
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own .empirical fashion and answers it in his o\m way, which 
is not always very conclusive.
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CHAPTER II
JOHN STUART MILL
John Stuart Mill is more famous and well-known for 
his views on political liberty than for his conception of 
freedom of the will. The latter is only an incidental and 
supplementary development in connection with the account of 
causation. His conception of free-will was first expressed 
in his 'System of Logic* under the title of "Of Liberty and 
Necessity"^ which clearly indicates Humean and the Hobbesean 
inclinations. Later in "An Examination of Sir William 
Hamilton's Philosophy",^ he criticised the idea of the 
freedom of will as held by Sir William Hamilton and 
forwarded his own opinion on the matter. These later views 
are nothing but the enlargement and elaboration of his 
earlier views. The only difference is that here he gives 
more importance to the moral side of the question.
Mill follows the tradition of British Empiricism 
which Hobbes, Locke and Hume had established. Like Hume, 
he treats the problem of free-will from a consistent 
empiricist's standpoint. Like Hume again, he feels it 
necessary to define the terms generally involved in the 
problem of freedom. These terms are: causality, necessity,
1. A System of Logic, Bk.6. Ch.II, 9th ed. 1875#
2. An Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy, Ch.XXVI, 
p.564 (6th ed.) 1889.
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predictability and liberty. It is his idea also, although 
he does not suggest it explicitly, that the problem of 
freedom is a problem of the ambiguities of the meanings of 
the terms used. Once these meanings are clarified, 
Determinism becomes compatible with human freedom. Mill’s 
treatment of the problem is entirely Humean, except for a 
few qualifications which he adds here and there.
Before I enter into the detailed analysis of Mill’s 
theory of freedom, I wish to point out the inconsistencies 
of his language when he describes the ideas of causality 
and necessity in connection with the freedom of the will.
Mill’s theory of causation is an attempt to develop 
the commonsense view in a consistent way. Causation for him 
is nothing but a regular sequence observable among 
phenomena. He says that experience does not show any causal 
nexus or sufficient reason in the cause, but only an 
invariable sequence.^ In the beginning of his essay, "Of 
Liberty and Necessity" he asks the question whether the law 
of causality applies in the same strict sense to human 
action as it is to other phenomena, and his answer is 
positive. He regards this question as the basic problem of 
the freedom of will.
1. Ibid., Gh.XXVI, p.576.
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Mill next proceeds to discard the idea of necessity 
in the sense of a mysterious constraint* He says :
(i) If necessity means such a mystical tie *then"the 
doctrine is not true of human action; hut neither is it then 
true of inanimate objects* It would be more correct to say 
that matter is not bound by necessity than that mind is so."^
(ii) Just like Hume, Mill thinks that "Some form of 
necessity is suggested by our collective experience of life" 
**. and .*• "any necessity other than the unconditional
p
universality of the fact we know nothing of*..*"
(iii) In his "A System of Logic", Mill makes a distinction
between causality and necessity. Mill thinks that the whole
problem of the freedom of will arises from a confusion
between the meanings of necessity and causality. He says,
"I am inclined to think that this error is almost wholly an
effect of associations with a word; and that it would be
prevented, by forbearing to employ, for the expression of
the simple fact of causation, so extremely inappropriate a
term as Necessity." He says ;*’'Causation is uniformity of
sequence*^ but ’hiecessity is more than this. It implies
%
irresistibleness*.^
(iv) A few lines after this assertion, Mill adds a
1. Logic, po-^25-
2. An Examination of W.Hamilton's Philosophy; Gh.XXVI,p.576. 
5. Logic, p.4-24*
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qualification to the idea of necessity. He says, necessity 
is of two types; (a) one is subject to counteraction and
(b) another which is not subject to counteraction. Human 
action, according to Mill, belongs to the first category. 
’'When the idea of necessity is applied to the human will,
"it only means that the given cause will be followed by the 
effect, subject to all possibilities of counteraction by 
other causes. But in common use it stands for the operation 
of those causes which are supposed •teo: b# too powerful to 
be counteracted at all."^
From (i) and (ii) it appears that by necessity, Mill 
means a constant conjunction or a regular sequence of 
events, and as such causality and necessity are equivalent. 
But in (iii), calling necessity ’irresistible", he makes a 
distinction between the ideas of causality and necessity, 
and by ’necessity’ means only the second type of necessity 
which he mentions in (iv). In (iii), causal relation seems 
to be resistible whereas necessary relation is not. But in
(iv), we are told, that in causation, there may be two 
different types of necessity - subject to counteraction or 
not subject to counteraction. This means that necessity 
not only means ’irresistibleness’, but also ’resistibleness’, 
i.e. sometimes it is unconditional necessity and sometimes
1. Ibid., p.424.
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it is a conditional one. These lines are in direct 
contradiction with what Mill has said in (iii). Mill gives 
two instances to clarify these two types of necessity.
Death for want of food or air is the example of unavoidable 
necessity, whereas death from poison is the example of 
avoidable necessity. Mill says, in the latter case death 
can be avoided by means of a stomach pump.
It is difficult to see the distinction between these 
two examples. If conditions remain the same, the death from 
poison is as unavoidable as the death from want of food or 
air. If conditions change, if in the case of death from 
poison, we can use a stomach pump and thus can avoid the 
result, then in the case of death from want of air, we can 
also use an oxygen cylinder and thus may avoid the necessary 
result. It would have been better if Mill had cited death 
only as an example of irresistible necessity. The necessity 
in the sense of unavoidability which must follow whatever 
may be the conditions, is not easy to be found. Even in the 
case of material operations, we find conditional necessity 
which is always subject to counteraction. Of course, Mill 
does not think that this irresistible necessity is difficult 
to find. On the contrary, he speaks of the "agencies of 
nature which are really uncontrollable."^
It is clear from what has been said before, that
1. Ibid., p.424
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Mill makes a distinction between the agencies operating in 
the case of human action, and the agencies of nature* The 
latter is uncontrollable, whereas the false sense of 
uncontrollableness in the former arises from the use of the 
same terms in both the cases. The causal principle which 
operates in the case of human action varies according to the 
variation of the preceding circumstances. The action follows 
necessarily, only when the cause is not controlled by some 
other causes. Human actions "are never (except in some cases 
of mania) ruled by any one motive with such absolute sway 
that there is no room for the influence of any other.
From this point of view "any given effect is only necessary 
provided that the causes tending to produce it are not 
controlled.
Mill hesitates to call this resistible regularity or 
causal connection by the name of necessity. Mill says,
"That whatever happens could not have happened otherwise 
unless something had taken place which was capable of 
preventing it, no one surely needs hesitate to admit. But to 
call this by the name of necessity is to use the term in a 
sense so different from its primitive and familiar meaning, 
from that which it bears in the common occasions of life as
5
to amount almost to play upon words.
This distinction between physical and mental cause on
1. Ibid., p.425.
2. Ibid., p.425.
3. Ibid., p.425.
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the basis of unavoidability and avoidability, is not really 
tenable. The physical necessity is as subject to the 
variations of conditions as mental necessity is* It is true, 
that, in the case of physical operations, sometimes causes 
are beyond our controlling capacity. But this does not mean 
that they are essentially irresistible, and independent of 
all conditional variations.
Even if we accept this basic difference between the 
mental and the material cause, it will put us in another 
difficulty. Both Hume and Mill accept the regular sequence 
of material objects as the standard case of causality and 
necessity. Then they draw a comparison between physical 
regularity and that of mental phenomena, and finding that 
they are similar in all respects, conclude that since, in 
the one case we can predict with accurate precision, in 
the other case we can also make similar predictions. This 
conclusion rests on the presupposition that the regular 
sequence observed in both the cases are similar. Mill says : 
"Volitions do, in point of fact, follow determinate moral 
antecedents with the same uniformity and (when we have 
sufficient knowledge of the circumstances) with the same 
certainty, as physical effects follow their physical causes." 
Here "the results are as uniform and as accurately foretold, 
as in any physical enquiries in which the effect depends upon 
a multiplicity of causes." And, "... the cases in which
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volitions seem too uncertain to admit of being confidently 
predicted, are those in which our knowledge of the 
influences antecedently in operation is so incomplete, that 
with equally imperfect data there would be the same 
uncertainty in the prediction of the astronomer and the 
chemist."^ Mill concludes, "a volition is a moral effect 
which follows the corresponding moral causes as certainly 
and invariably as physical effects follow their physical
p
causes."
All these statements are inconsistent with the 
distinction that Mill made between resistible mental agencies 
and irresistible physical agencies. If they are really 
different, then the possibility of making accurate 
predictions in one case cannot be a guarantee of making 
such predictions in the other.
Like Hume, Mill believes in the predictability of
human action. Human action is predictable with as much
certainty as can be done in the case of physical events,
provided one knows the preceding conditions. Mill takes this
proposition as a "mere interpretation of universal
experience, a statement in the words of what everyone is
%
internally convinced of."
1. An Examination of Sir. W.Hamilton’s Philosophy, p.577#
2. Ibid., p.578.
5- Logic, p.422.
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As to the interpretation of universal experience it 
can he said that our experience provides not only the 
information of successful prediction but also that of 
unsuccessful falsified prediction. In some cases we believe 
in the possibility of prediction, in some other cases, we 
do not. An interpretation of experience gives evidences 
for both sides. It is much easier to show that human 
behaviour in general, is predictable. But it is difficult to 
prove this of individual behaviour. For instance, it is 
easy to predict how the average intelligent human beings 
would behave in a certain situation than to say how x would 
behave in that situation. Experience supplies arguments in 
favour of both. As Professor Ramsey says, "... unpredicta­
bility seems to arise only because we are too easily content 
with a restricted number of cause factors. In the same way 
... predictability may seem to arise when we are too easily 
content with an imperfect description of a certain 
situation.
Hence an appeal to "the interpretation of universal 
experience" does not place the necessitarians in a better 
position.
Mill claims that the prediction of human action 
could be as accurate and precise as that of physical 
phenomena. Such precise prediction can be made only on the
1# I.T, Ramsey: Freedom and Immortality, Ch.I, p.16 
Date I960.
58
basis of a necessary relation between cause and effect.
In Mill’s theory, the term ’necessity’ is used in the 
regularity sense. So far as our experience goes, A is 
regularly followed by B. When one predicts, one does 
that on the basis of this regularity. Regarding this 
regularity, Mill says that we do not know whether it ’must* 
be so, but it always ’does' so. If we make prediction on 
the basis of this regularity which refers only to past and 
present states of affairs, our prediction will not be 
precise and accurate knowledge of the future - but just an 
expectation, a shaky belief.
Prediction, on the basis of regularity, would be 
accurate, if the future is always the repetition of the 
past. But there are cases of mental phenomena where such 
repetition is completely absent. For instance, when I am 
writing a poem for the first time in my life, there is no 
observable regularity behind, on the basis of which 
prediction can be made as to why I use a particular image 
to describe a situation, and not the others. Again, even 
if I had been writing poetry for a long time, and had used 
one particular image on several occasions, nobody can 
predict on the basis of this, that, in future, I shall use 
the same image on a similar occasion. It may happen that 
being tired of the past image, I apply a new one. Of course, 
according to Mi.ll, one could have done that if one knew the
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new motive. But, in practice, such knowledge is not possible 
when one proceeds on the basis of mere regularity*
It is true that in many cases we do predict on the 
basis of regularity, and sometimes the causal connections 
are explicable only in terms of regularity. Yet, the 
predictions based on regularity tend to be inaccurate 
whereas the predictions based on necessity are not* The 
reason for this is that, in a regular sequence, the cause 
and effect are treated as isolated and discrete units, 
which are connected only temporally and sometimes spatially 
too, e.g. "the cloud is followed by the rain" or "the flesh 
divided and the blade went in between the divided parts".*
In these cases, the cause is simply an incident 
which regularly precedes the effect. Nothing is suggested 
more than this. On the basis of this type of regularity, 
"taking my brief-case in my hand" is as much a cause of 
"my going out" (as they follow in a regular order for a 
pretty long time, and sometimes one can be predicted from 
the other) as ’cloud' is the cause of ’rain*.
Such regular sequences cannot afford a sure basis 
for prediction. In order to predict correctly we must have 
a knowledge of the whole situation that goes beyond mere 
regularity. This means that the cause-event and the effect- 
event are brought under a theory, or mere precisely, are
I owe this example to Prof. H.B.Acton.
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explained by means of a law.
In the phenomenal world, the logical necessity like 
2+2 = 4 is hardly obtainable, but still, the cause-effect 
relation, although contingent, is something more than a 
regular sequence. As Mr. N.R. Hanson puts it, "No case of 
saying truly that X is the cause of Y is a case of just 
having seen X and Y are related temporally and spatially.
It is also a case of seeing that since X is the kind of 
thing that it is, Y is just what might have been expected 
to happen.^ Hence, prediction of the effect, from the 
cause is justifiable and guaranteed only when they are 
brought under a theory. A cause in order to be a cause, 
presupposes a theory. It can be said against this that what 
we call a theory or law of the phenomenal order, is nothing 
but a generalization of several instances of regularity.
This may be true. But when the relation of cause and effect 
is explained by means of a theory, much more is suggested 
regarding the nature of the cause ( as to why it stands 
in such a relation with the effect which in future can 
serve as a ground for prediction), than what is done in mere 
regular sequence.
Referring to the theistic belief. Mill says that if 
freedom of will is consistent with Divine foreknowledge,
1. N.R. Hanson; Causal Chains ; Mind; 1955, Ps299*
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then it can be consistent with any other foreknowledge* On 
the basis of this, he suggests that, in an agent-observer 
situation, it is possible for the agent to enjoy freedom of 
action, whereas at the same time, the observer can predict 
his action in every detail. But, Divine foreknowledge if 
there is any, is not on the same level with ordinary human 
foreknowledge. The latter requires justification from 
experience, the former does not. This is rather a 
particular theological proposition which does not help the 
necessitarians very much.
Like Hume, Mill does not believe in the existence 
of freedom which is opposite to causal necessity. With Sir 
William Hamilton, he agrees that the real supposition of 
the free-will doctrine is that our volitions are uncaused.
It is interesting to note the comment of *An 
Inquirer' in this matter. 'The Inquirer' says that the free­
will doctrine does not mean that our volitions are uncaused
1but that they are caused by 'me'. But the 'Inquirer' has 
misunderstood Mill, and I agree with Mill that nothing is 
really gained by calling 'I' the cause of our volitions. 
When we say that 'I' am the cause of a particular volition, 
what we really mean is that a desire or motive of mine is 
the cause of that volition. Any change in my desire, will
1. The Battle of the Two Philosophies by An Inquiëreh p.4-5.
Pub. 1866. /
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be. followed by a change in my volition. But if we want to 
mean that the volition changes even when the 'I* (including 
all desires and motives) remains unchanged and static, then 
the changed volition is really uncaused*
Mill gives us two reasons for our belief in the 
freedom of the will; (1) Our instinctive consciousness of 
freedom and (2) the feeling that the denial of freedom 
degrades our moral nature^ Mill analyses both these two 
sources and shows that they are insufficient to prove the 
justifiability of our belief in the freedom of will in the 
sense of freedom from causal necessity.
As to the first, Mill follows more or less, the same 
line of argument as that offered by Hume. He says, that, 
believing that there is something more in a causal 
connection, some mysterious bond, than mere regularity, and 
finding the absence of such mysterious bond in the case of 
volitions, people conclude that they are not compelled to 
obey any particular motive, they are free. But this is a 
pseudo-feeling of freedom. Mill says, that if feeling of 
liberty is true, then "Our internal consciousness tells us 
that we have a power, which the whole outward experience of 
the human race tells us that we never use."^ Mill analyses 
very clearly this pseudo-feeling of freedom. He asks the 
question, is it really the freedom of the will of which we
1. An Examination of Sir. W.Hamilton's Philosophy, p.578.
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are directly conscious, or are we conscious cf moral 
responsibility in which the idea of freedom is implied?
Mill first takes up the proposition that we are 
directly conscious of free-will. This consciousness arises 
from the fact, as Mansel says, that conditions remaining 
the same, we can choose A today, and B tomorrow. But here, 
Mill rightly points out, although the antecedent conditions 
are not altered, what has altered is our judgment of these 
conditions. If our judgment remains the same, together with 
the conditions, we shall not be able to choose B tomorrow. 
Hence, whenever there is a change in our choice, the change 
is not due to chance, but either it is due to a change of 
the external conditions or a change of our mental attitude. 
Of course it is true that the Libertarians,when they say 
'we can choose A today, and B tomorrow', they do not mean 
that it is due to chance. All that they mean is that it is 
determined by the self. But the 'determination of the self* 
means, either, the self itself is again caused by some other 
factors external to the self, or the self is not caused by 
anything else. The former is against the Libertarian theory, 
and the latter is equivalent to saying, as the Determinists 
have shown, that there is a break in the causal nexus or 
an accident, i.e. a chance.
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Kill's argument against the direct consciousness 
of free-will is as follows;
"To be conscious of free-will, must mean, to be 
conscious, before I have decided, that I am able to decide 
either way.... Consciousness tells me what I do or feel.
But what I am able to do, is not a subject of consciousness. 
Consciousness is not prophetic; we are conscious of what is, 
not of what will or can be. We never know that we are able 
to do a thing, except from having done it, or something 
equal and similar to it. We should not know that we were 
capable of action at all, if we had never acted. Having 
acted we know, as far as that experience reaches, how we 
are able to act; and this knowledge, when it has become 
familiar, is often confounded with, and called by the name 
of, consciousness."
The implications of this passage are threefold:
(1) The statement *I can decide ...' is an ability-statement 
and therefore cannot be obtained prior to experience.
(2) Being an ability-statement, it does not describe any 
state of consciousness, and,
(3) It is hypothetical, not categorical, i.e. it always 
refers to past or future conditions.
1. An Examination of Sir W.Hamilton's Philosophy, p.580.
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(1) As to the first, if the statement *I can decide* means 
*I am able to decide*, then it is true that we cannot be 
conscious of our abilities unless we have exerted them. To 
use Mill's example, "If we are born with a cataract, we 
are not conscious previous to being couched, of our ability 
to see."^ This is true of all of our primitive and first 
experiences. Unless we learn to walk, we are not conscious 
of our ability of walking, although we may know what it 
means from the walking of other people. It is only after 
experiencing the exercise of an ability, that we become 
conscious of the ability. To a grown-up man, no consciousness 
of his own abilities is primitive and first in this sense, 
in which it is 'first' to a child who is learning everything 
through experience. There is nothing absolutely 'new* and 
'first* to a man. In every situation where constraint or 
compulsion is absent, we know that we can decide either 
way, before we have decided. Thus what is obtained from 
experience, later becomes a part of our permanent knowledge.
Mill is right when he says that sometimes this 
acquired knowledge of abilities is confounded with direct 
consciousness or awareness. But it must be pointed out that 
by consciousness of free-will, Hamilton, Mansel and others, 
do not mean any innate or inborn idea prior to experience. 
Hence, the question at issue is, not whether ability-
1. Ibid., Note. p.581.
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statements like 'I can decide’ are prior to experience, 
but whether they can describe any state of consciousness.
(2) This refers to the second implication. It is difficult 
to determine whether a statement like 'I can decide* 
describes a state of consciousness, because the meaning of 
the verb 'can* , as used by Mill, is not very explicit.
P.P. Alexander, in his criticism of Mill, says, "According 
to Mill, we know that we are able to act, but have no 
consciousness of being able, though how this should be 
unless knowledge is denied as a mode of consciousness, Mr.
Mill has omitted to explain."^ Here Alexander regards 
knowledge of an ability as equivalent to a mode of 
consciousness; and this is what Mill seems to have opposed 
in his theory.
It appears from what Mill says, that the verb * can* 
in *I can decide* is a dispositional verb. It implies an 
ability. It means that * I know, I shall be able to decide....*, 
and knowledge of an ability does not describe any present 
mental state, but only a particular disposition to act in a 
particular way. Here Mill anticipates Ryle and Austin. In 
the languages of Ryle and Austin, * can * stands for a 
"capacity verb" or a "performative word". To say, *I can 
decide* does not entail a state of consciousness of actual
1. P.P. Alexander: Mill and Carlyle, p.23, 1866.
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decision or the opposite. This is what Mill means when he 
says that consciousness tells us what 'is*. The capacity of 
making a decision, being an ability, cannot be given by 
direct consciousness. He says "Ability and force are not real 
entities, which can be felt as present when no effect 
follows. They are abstract names for happening of the 
effect on the occurrence of the needful conditions, or for 
our expectation of its happening."^
Granted that free-will cannot be obtained from 
direct consciousness, what is the ultimate outcome of Mill's 
contention? It seems to me that all that Mill wants to 
discard is the idea that free-will can be apprehended by a 
single mental action. The ability to decide or any other 
ability is not a type of being which can be apprehended by 
a single conscious state of the mind. But this cannot 
disprove the idea of free-will as such. The notion of free­
will may not be derived from direct consciousness. But, 
since, to know something is to know it as true, if the 
ability of making decision is knov/n to us, then this 
knowing cannot but be true* Without the ability of decision, 
we cannot decide either way, and it does not matter, how 
we come to know the ability.
1. An Examination of Sir W.Hamilton's Philosophy, p.581 note.
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(5) The third implication is the outcome of the second one. 
If the statement, 'I can decide* is an ability-statement 
and does not describe a state of consciousness, but a 
disposition, then it is conditional. It means that such a 
statement is hypothetical referring either to a past 
conditional or to a future one. *I can decide* either means, 
* I can, if I have experience*, or * I can, if I try*. In each 
of the two cases, it is assumed that the if-clause stands 
for a conditional clause.
It is a general way of expressing the dispositional 
statements in terms of the verb * can*, and can-statements 
are generally thought to involve *if-clauses*. They are 
supposed to be incomplete without the 'if-clauses*. For 
instance, "I am able to swim" means "I can swim", which 
again means "I can, if I know or if doctor gives me 
permission."
The difficulty of attaching an *if-clause* with the 
can-statement is that there remains always a temptation to 
consider this as a causal-conditicn. If, the 'if* of a 
can-statement is always a causal conditional, then denial 
of the consequent will always mean the denial of the 
antecedent and vice versa. For instance, if the *if* of 
"I can swim, if I know" is a conditional if then "I cannot 
swim" will mean "I do not know swimming", and again "I do 
not know swimming" will mean "I cannot swim". But in the
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statement, 'I can, if I try', the denial of *I can* does 
not mean that I have not tried. Nor does the denial of the 
antecedent 'if I try', mean that 'I cannot'. It simply means 
that 'I can, whether I try or not, i.e. I am able to*. This 
is what Austin means when he says that * can* is not always 
conditional or subjunctive, but sometimes indicative too. 
Moreover, the 'if* here, is not always an *if* of causal 
condition, it may be an *if* of, doubt, hesitation or 
stipulation.^
Austin has shown that verbs like * can* which are 
supposed to imply an *if clause *, can also occur without 
an *if-clause*. "For let the verb in question be to X; 
then we shall never say simply *I X*, but always *I X if 
I Y*; but then also, according to the accepted rules, if it 
is true that *I X if I Y*, and also true (which it must 
surely sometimes be) that *1 do, in fact, Y*, it must
surely follow *I X*, simpliciter,without any *if* about it
2
any longer."
It is true that these * can * and * could have* state­
ments can be expressed in a subjunctive mood with an if- 
condition. For instance, *1 can decide' may be analysed into
1. J.L. Austin: Ifs and Cans ; Proceedings of British 
Academy: Vol.XLII, 1956, pp.115-11?•
2. Ibid., p.118.
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'I shall, if I try'. But still 'I can' does not always 
lead to 'I shall ...if. Austin gives another example in 
support of this; "'I can hole it this time', does not mean 
that I shall hole it this time if I try or if anything else; 
for I may try and miss, and yet not he convinced that I 
couldn't have done it;"^
The point is this, that here Austin has used 'can* 
in a general sense. The statement * I can hole it' means I 
am able to hole it or I am usually able to hole it, if I 
try. But here, it also means, that I can hole this type of 
thing or whatever it may be. In this case, even if I fail, 
my failure does not disprove my ability.
But there are cases where 'can* is used to mean a 
particular specific action. In that case, 'I am able to 
hole it* means that I am able to hole only this and here 
failure means I have not the ability to hole it. In the 
latter case, when 'if is used, it stands for a causal 
conditional, but this does not happen in the case of the 
former.
Hence, it can be concluded, that, though the first 
two contentions of Mill are correct, the last one is not so. 
Mill has suggested the conditional use of the verb 'can*, 
but it need not be always conditional. The can-statements
1. Ibid., p.119-
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being ability-statements, can be expressed in terms of 
'shall ••• if', but this is not universally true; nor the 
'if, used in such expression, always refers to a past or 
future conditional.
In the beginning, Mill was not free from the idea of 
the direct consciousness of the free-will. In "A System of 
Logic", he spoke of "a feeling of moral freedom of which 
we are conscious of"^ and of "a practical feeling of free­
will common in a greater or less degree to all mankind," 
Again, in the introduction of his essay 'On Social Freedom*, 
he has expressed similar views. He thought that the belief 
in free-will is not based upon any process of logical 
argumentation but on some immediate or spontaneous sense, 
on some movement of consciousness. Men believe that they
2
are free ... mainly because they cannot help believing it.
All these statements are inconsistent with what Mill 
wants to establish so forcefully in "An Examination of Sir 
William Hamilton's Philosophy", although Mill himself 
denied that there was any inconsistency or incompatibility
1. Logic, p.427.
2. Mill; on Social Freedom, p.33. (Reprinted 1941 - by
D. Fosdick). (This essay was not published during 
Mill's life-time, and is hardly mentioned in any study 
of Mill's work, or in his Bibliography; the exact year 
when it was written can not be known. Moreover, the 
tone of the essay differs from his earlier writings.
All these make it doubtful whether Mill wrote it. 
Supposing that Mill wrote it, it is not consistent with 
what he said in the Logic, as well as in *An Examination 
of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy', regarding the 
feeling of freedom).
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between bis views expressed in these two books.
Mill says that, the actual implication of the 
statement that •one's will is free * - is that I could have 
chosen the other course, if I had preferred it, but not 
that I could have chosen one course while I preferred the 
other. He rejects * our ability to will in opposition to our 
strongest preference." This means that all our actions are 
determined by our strongest motive or in other words, our 
action follows necessarily from our stringest motive which 
is the determining cause of it. In the case of a choice, 
where we are able to act either way, we are always guided by 
our strongest motive is formed by our assessment of the 
comparative values of the alternatives differing in some 
respects or by our preferences, our inclinations etc. This 
gives rise to the following difficulties.
There are cases where it is difficult to form a 
strongest motive. This happens with random action. For 
instance, in a magic show, when the magician asks me to 
choose one of the two Sticks lying on the table, which are 
exactly alike in all respects, there is no reason why I 
shall choose stick No.l instead of the stick No.2. There 
is no observable difference between the two sticks by which 
I can ascertain their values and thereby conform my 
strongest motive to choose Stick No.l. In this case, I am 
not acting in accordance with some strongest motive.
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It may be argued that under these circumstances, I am 
governed by the strongest motive that I must choose one, 
whatever it may be. It does not matter whether it is stick 
No.l or stick No.2. But this is not compatible with the 
idea of predictability which Mill asserts. Mill says that 
human action is predictable, if one can know the antecedent 
conditions. Now, the strongest motive of any action is one 
of the causal conditions. But here the knowledge of the 
strongest motive does not help at all to predict my choosing 
stick No.l, rather than stick No.2. Even if the observer 
knows all antecedent conditions including the strongest 
motive, he will not be able to predict this type of random 
action which is voluntary and unpredictable.
If to act freely means to enjoy the liberty of 
indifference, then the random actions are nearer to the 
liberty of indifference than to the liberty of spontaneity.
Mill next proceeds to consider the second alternative, 
that the idea of freedom is implied in the idea of moral 
responsibility. Denial of it degrades our moral nature.
By 'freedom* he means "our ability to act in direct 
opposition to our strongest preference", i.e. equivalent 
to the freedom from causal necessity. Mill thinks that the 
idea of moral responsibility implies the idea of punishment. 
Here Mill has interpreted, as Bradley points out, the 
popular notion of responsibility. In the mind of an
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ordinary man the idea of responsibility is connected with 
those actions only, which are again connected with the idea 
of punishment* But this is rather an incorrect interpretation 
of the popular mind. There are cases where moral 
responsibility does not always imply the idea of punishment 
to an ordinary mind. For instance, a person may save a man 
from drowning, or from fire, at the risk of his own life, 
though he is under no pressure of punishment* Men often 
volunteer to do things under the pressure of moral 
responsibility which is not attached with any idea of 
punishment whatsoever.
It can be said that in such cases the person is at 
least blameable and blame is punishment. But blame is not a 
sort of punishment. This is evident from our use of the 
following sentences; "he may be blameable, but should not 
be punished" or "I can blame him but, cannot punish him." 
These sentences do not involve any logical inconsistency. 
Blame may refer to punishment. But it is not punishment. 
Moreover, there are cases where one feels oneself 
responsible for helping a wicked man, though he cannot be 
blamed for not doing that. For instance, the Bishop in 
"Les Misérables" of Victor Hugo, saved Jean Val Jean from 
being handed over to the police and thus from imprisonment, 
under no pressure of blame or anything like that.
The difficult question which Mill has to face in
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this connection is, if our actions are always caused hy the 
motives of which punishment is one, how men could be held 
responsible for their actions, and how the infliction of 
punishment could be justified.
The answer which Mill gives is essentially Humean, 
but it does not contradict his notions of mind and personal 
identity as it did in the case of Hume, Although a Humean in 
other respects. Mill differs from Hume*s flux-theory of the 
mind. Mill thinks, that mind or the self is something 
distinct from the states of consciousness, it is a 
"sentient subject", "a mysterious something which has the 
thoughts but is not the thought", and which can be 
conceived of as "existing forever in a state of quiescence 
without any thought at all"
Such a conception of mind, however dubitable if may 
be, is quite compatible with the idea of causal necessity of 
the motives and actions, on which Mill's theory of 
punishment rests. Mill says, "Punishment proceeds on the 
assumption that our will is governed by motives; if 
punishment had no power of acting on the will, it would 
be illegitimate however natural might be the inclination to 
inflict it. Just so far as the will is supposed free, that 
is capable of acting against motives, punishment is 
disappointed of its object, and deprived of its 
justification."^
1. Logic Bk. 1 Ch.Ill, Sec,8, p.68.
2. An Examination of Sir W.Hamilton's Philosophy,Ch.ZZVl.p.592
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IVhat Mill wants to mean here is, that the idea of 
moral responsibility implies the idea of punishment, but 
the latter does not imply free-will. On the contrary, without 
the principle of necessity, the idea of punishment will lose 
all its meanings.
Mill justifies punishment on the ground of two ends: 
(1) for the benefit of the offender himself, and (2) for 
the self-defence of the society. It is just to punish a man 
either for his own good or for the good of the society.
Mill says, "Free will or no free-will, it is just to 
punish so far as is necessary for this purpose, as it is 
just to put a wild beast to death (without unnecessary 
suffering) for the same object."^
This is not only a theory of punishment based on 
causal necessity, but a typical expression of the 
utilitarian outlook, though Mill is "indifferent whether we 
are utilitarians, or anti-utilitarians." These two ends, so 
far as they are based on the consideration of the injury done 
by the offender to himself and to the society, are quite 
convincing, but Mill has overlooked another point which 
also demands consideration when we want to inflict 
punishment. This is the consideration of the nature of the 
cause and of the agent of the action. So far as our 
ordinary notion of justice is concerned, mere ideas of the
1. Ibid., p.594.
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benefit of the offender as well as of the society, cannot 
justify punishment unless these two factors are considered. 
And when they are considered, they imply the idea of free­
will.
Mill has compared the offender with the wild beast, 
which for the benefit of others is to be sacrificed. This 
implies that an offender should be judged only by his action. 
But, in actual practice, we make discriminations among 
human beings, when we want to inflict punishment* We do not 
treat a sane adult, a child and a lunatic in the same way 
for the same sort of offence. We do not put the lunatic or 
the child on the electric chair for the benefit of the 
society or for their own benefit. This distinction shows 
that the two ends mentioned by Mill cannot justify punishment 
unless they are supplemented by an analysis of the nature of 
the cause and of the agent. So far as the agent is 
concerned, he must be a moral agent. So far as the cause is 
concerned, it must not be irresistible, i.e. the action can 
be otherwise leaving room for the operation of the free­
will of a moral agent. If the agent is nothing but a 
helpless puppet tied up with the thread of causal necessity, 
he cannot do otherwise and hence he is not free to act.
According to Mill, all our actions are causally 
determined by our motives; our motives are determined by our 
characters; our characters are determined by our desires; 
our desires arise from certain situations which again are
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caused by some physical or psychical factors. In the long 
run, the physical forces are the ’ultimate causes’ whereas 
our desires and wills are ’intermediate agents’ for the 
formation of our character. On Mill’s theory, an action can 
never be otherwise, because when one cause is given, the 
rest of the causes and effects follow necessarily in a 
regular order. Under such circumstances, when a man commits 
a murder, it is irrelevant to ask whether he has done it
intentionally; the fact is that he cannot help it, he has to
do it. Hence, on Mill’s theory, it is just to punish a man 
even though his offence is a necessary result of the causes 
beyond his control.
Mill himself would have surely objected to such a 
conclusion, as it leads to fatalism. Both in the ’Logic’ as
well as in ’An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s
Philosophy’, he has clearly pointed out the distinction 
between fatalism and his causal determinism.
According to fatalism whatever happens must happen in 
spite of any effort to prevent it. Whereas Mill says that 
whatever happens must happen provided nothing happens to 
prevent it. "The true doctrine of causation of human 
actions maintains ..• that not only our conduct but our 
character is in part amenable to our will; that we can, by 
employing the proper means, improve our character."^ Mill
1. An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, p.601
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recognizes "the power of the mind to cooperate in the 
formation of its own character". Hill says that it is true 
that the wish or will which induces us to form our character, 
is formed for us, hut they are formed not only hy our 
organization or education, "hut by our experience - 
experience of the painful consequences of the character we 
previously had, or by some strong feeling of admiration or 
aspiration accidentally aroused,"^ "... This feeling of 
our being able to modify our own character, if we wish, is 
itself the feeling of moral freedom which we are conscious 
of."2
This is definitely a new qualification to the theory 
of freedom, which we do not find in Hume. But the question 
is how far can we really wish, if we wish to change our 
character.
Mill thinks that we can change our character by our
"voluntary exertion". These voluntary exertions are not
non-caused, but "like"'all other voluntary acts, presuppose
that there was already something in our character, or in
that combined with our circumstances, which led us to do
%
so n and accounts for our doing so."
1. Logic, p.426.
2. Ibid., p*427.
5. An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy, p.603
80
In short, what Mill wants to establish is that, 
though motive determining action, is derived from our 
character, sometimes our character is determined by our own 
desire to determine it. But this desire itself again arises 
from our character and circumstances which compel us to 
desire so. For instance, I shall act honestly, when I have 
an honest motive which arises from my honest character; 
again, my honest character is determined or formed by my 
desire to be honest and my circumstances; and again my 
desire to be honest arises from my honest character and my 
circumstances, and so on ad infinitum.
This seems to be a vicious circle from where there 
is no way out. The so-called ’volimtary exertion* really 
means nothing, because in each case of such exertion, we 
have to wait helplessly for the mercy of the influence made 
by our character and circumstances. Unless they influence 
us, we cannot voluntarily exert ourselves to change our 
character. But their influence again depends on our desire to 
so influence, i.e. on our voluntary exertion.
Mill has prescribed a way for getting out of our bad 
character. But this should be equally meant for the goodness 
or badness of our character, as in both cases we are equally 
unable to exert ourselves unless some occasion arises. He 
says "If our character is such that while it remains what 
it is, it necessitates us to do wrong, it will be just to
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apply motives which, will necessitate us to strive for its 
improvement"•
It appears that it is very easy to apply the right 
motives whenever we feel the necessity of changing our 
character. But in practice, it is not. Because, for the 
emergence of the right motive in our mind, we have to wait 
for the right occasion to be created by our character, 
circumstances and volition; and once we refer to these three 
factors we are involved in an endless vicious circle. Hence, 
we cannot justly apply the motive to set us right. Only  ^
certain social or individual authority can do that by 
inflicting punishment or by some other means, which will 
act as a motive to set us right. According to Mill, it is 
just to punish a person for his own benefit. Hence, it is 
justifiable to say that, we must be punished at the very 
beginning before we start to exert ourselves to modify our 
characters in the right direction.
According to Mill the feeling of moral freedom 
consists of this feeling of our being able to modify our 
character, if we so desire. This sounds like the 
"consciousness of free will" or "the consciousness of being 
able to decide, before one has decided...", which Mill 
rejects at the outset of his theory.
Here ability to modify our character rests on our 
ability to wish. If we can really wish then we shall be able 
to modify our character. But our wishing or willing is not
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a free act of desire. Rather, it is provoked or caused "by 
some other factors like our internal character and the 
external circumstances - analysis of which, as we have 
already seen, involves a reasoning in circle. Since, Mill 
"believes in a regular sequence of motive and action, the 
desire to modify our character is always necessitated by 
some causal factors in the presence of which, we can not 
say that we can modify our character, but we have to so 
modify. Waen the motive A is given, it is irrelevant to ask 
whether I can wish B, but I have to wish B.
Mill makes a few additions to this position. He says 
that "a person is morally free who feels that his habits or 
his temptations are not his master but he theirs."^
Here Mill makes a distinction between a person and 
his habits and temptations which are nothing but certain 
states of his mind. Regarding mind. Mill observes, that we 
can know only the states of consciousness, although he has 
not denied the existence of a conscious self distinct from 
these states. But this is unknown to us as such. Hence, 
when Mill says that our actions are caused by our motives, 
he means these states of consciousness. Temptations are 
nothing but different types of motives which can cause our 
action. In the regular sequence of motive and action, no 
question of the conscious agent arises. In his treatment of
1. Logic, p.427.
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the causal necessity, Mill has nowhere spoken of this 
conscious agent. Hence, this sudden remark is not in tune 
with his general view of regular sequence of motives and 
actions.
Further difficulty arises when Mill says that even in 
yielding to these temptations one knows that he could resist, 
This can he interpreted in two different ways : (i) either 
he knows that he can resist or (ii) he could resist if he 
preferred of if things were different.
As to the first; to say that while yielding to a 
temptation one knows that one can resist, is to say that 
both ’yielding* and 'resisting* can be the consequences of 
the same motive 'temptation'. But Mill thinks that the 
relation between motive and its consequent action is as 
regular as that of physical objects. Hence, given the motive
i.e. the temptation, only one result follows from it - 
either resisting or yielding. If anyone yields to it, he 
cannot resist, or if he resists, he cannot yield.
The second alternative that he could, if things were 
different, describes a new situation completely different 
from what Mill exactly wants to mean. To say that ’he could, 
if things were different' is not to say that ’he can resist, 
while he is yielding.* The second alternative is not a true 
interpretation of Mill's view.
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The proposition that ’he could do otherwise if things 
were different, or if he preferred' - seems to he a 
significant proposition in Mill's theory of freedom* He has 
frequently mentioned it in different forms* Although a 
necessitarian, he wants to leave room for free action, and 
that he has attempted to do by means of this proposition.
He thinks that in the case of human action "the work is not 
so irrevocably done as to be incapable of being altered."
It is true that anyone could do otherwise, if things 
were different. The truth of the consequent depends on the 
truth of the antecedent. But in Mill's regularity version of 
causal necessity, there is no room for the alteration of 
the antecedent. Everything follows here in a regular 
sequence. The antecedent 'if things were different* never 
happens. Nothing happens which can enable one to do 
otherwise.
Mill, like Hume, does not distinguish between the 
mechanical causation observable in the case of physical 
objects and the mental causation of motive and action. Both, 
to him, are equally invariable, unconditional regular 
sequences of cause and effect. But in practice, in order to 
leave room for human freedom, he suggests that the human 
action is not irrevocably done. It could have been otherwise* 
This hopeful idea of Mill's is rather an empty idea. So 
long as we believe in the regularity theory of causation, 
things could never be différente This is also not compatible
85
with what he says in the beginning of his essay on liberty 
and necessity. There he believes that "the law of causality 
applies in the same strict sense to human actions as to 
other phenomena.”
Mill has tried honestly to reconcile freedom with 
Determinism and thereby to make room for moral appraisal.
But the propositions, by which he wants to do it, when 
analysed properly, reveal that his is also a position of the 
so-called hard determinist*s and has little distinction with 
the "Asiatic Fatalism" which he has despised so much. To say 
that we shall not try to change our fate, as everything is 
determined and as we have no power to alter it, is not much 
different, than to say that unless we have some impetus to 
desire the alteration of our character, we shall not so 
desire, and for that impetus we have to wait for 
circumstantial influences. The arguments advocated by the 
later determinists, can be regarded as an effort to justify 
Mill's contention. They have tried to interpret the meanings 
of the verbs 'can' and 'could have' in favour of 'an action's 
being otherwise'. They say that actions are subject to 
moral appraisal only when they could have been otherwise. 
According to Moore, the real meaning of "it could have been 
otherwise" is "it could have been otherwise, if I had chosen." 
And as such it does not violate the law of causation. Moore 
also raises the question, "whether we ever could have chosen
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what we did not choose, or ever can choose, what in fact, we 
shall not choose,"^ and answers that we "often could have 
chosen, what, in fact, we did not choose*" He gives two 
reasons in support of his contention; (1); we should have 
so chosen, if we had chosen to make the choice»
The phrase "choosing to make a choice" does not 
describe any intelligible mental experience or action.
Either, it involves an infinite regress like: "I have 
chosen X", means, "I have chosen to choose X", means "I have 
have chosen to choose to choose X" and so on; or, it means 
simply I have chosen one of the possible alternatives.
Moore says that "there certainly is such a thing as
making an effort to induce ourselves to choose a particular
2
course;" But 'effort to induce ourselves to choose', is not 
'choosing a choice'*
(2) The second reason is: "Whenever we have several different 
courses of action in view, it is possible for us to 
choose any one of them*., in such cases we can hardly ever 
know for certain beforehand, which choice we actually shall 
make."^
But this is not possible from Mill's standpoint. Mill 
believes in predictability of human action. So, if we know 
the conditions accurately, we also know which choice we are
1. G.E.Moore: Ethics, Ch.VI, p.218.
2. Ibidc, p.219,
3. Ibid., p.219.
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going to make. And the possibility of the alternative 
actions is only due to our ignorance. The connection between 
cause and effect being regular and invariable, a cause can 
have only one effect. Under the circumstances, it is 
possible to choose (if it can be so called) only one of the 
alternatives, but not any one of them. In Mill's philosophy 
of causal regularity, there is no room for an action's 
being otherwise.
Like Hume, Mill also was not very successful in 
reconciling the two ideas of free-will and determinism, by 
removing the verbal confusions which both of them thought 
to be the only defect of the original problem.
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CHAPTER III
P. H. BRADLEY
Hume-Mi 11 empiricism is the "background out of which 
Bradley's notions of freedom and predictability emerge.
His view is a dialectical outcome of the theories of his 
predecessors and is not merely an incidental introduction 
of his ethical views.
In his essay "The vulgar notion of responsibility in 
connection with the theories of free-will and necessity",^ 
he has seldom referred explicitly to his predecessors 
except for a few occasional references made towards Mill, 
though, in his careful exposition of the problem he has 
weighed each and every argument of his predecessors.
The philosopher whom he has specially in his mind^is 
J.S. Mill, as a necessitarian, and it is a legitimate 
question to ask whether Bradley has answered Mill.
For Hume and Mill, the problem of free-will is 
essentially a problem of the compatibility of free human 
action with the idea of causal necessity. The question of 
moral responsibility arises incidentally and is used as an 
argument in favour of causal necessity. Unless human actions
1. Ethical Studies: F.H. Bradley. 2nd ed. 1927# Essay I.
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are causally connected, the notion of moral responsibility 
becomes insignificant. The approach of Hume and Mill to 
this problem is psychological rather than ethical.
With Bradley, the problem starts from a different 
angle. He is not so much concerned with the question 
'whether human action can be free from causal necessity*, 
as he is with the question 'why we are moral' or 'what is 
the justification of so-called moral obligation?' He has 
shifted the issue from the region of causation to the 
domain of self-realisation which is an interesting 
combination of ethics with metaphysics,
Bradley's exposition of the problem of freedom, 
shows a clear Hegelian inclination. It proceeds in the form 
of a dialectical triad. He starts with the popular notion 
of moral responsibility?"proceeds from it to the 
general philosophical theories of freedom and necessity?^ 
and then after showing their failure to explain the 
popular notion of responsibility, reaches the synthesis in 
the idealistic conclusion of self-realization. This entire 
development of thought exhibits his discursive attitude 
and displays his eloquent dialectic which Sidgwick has 
termed 'debating-club-rhetoric'.^
1. Mind 1876; (Review of 'Ethical Studies' by H.Sidgwick), 
p.574,
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Referring to these two distinctive features of 
Bradley's analysis of the idea of freedom, viz (1) his 
criticisms of Libertarianism and Necessitarianism, and
(2) his suggestion that in terms of the notion of self- 
realization alone can it be shown how a man can be free, 
two questions can be raised:
(a) How far Bradley successfully differs from Hume and Mill 
in his treatment of the prevalent theories of freedom, and
(b) how far his conception of self-realisation is a 
solution of the problem of free-will.
The discussion of the first question demands an 
analysis of Bradley's position with regard to Indeterminism 
and Determinism.
Bradley accepts the 'vulgar' on the popular notion 
of moral responsibility as the provisional criterion for 
judging the adequacy or inadequacy of a given theory# If 
any theory is consistent with the 'vulgar' notion, it will 
serve the purpose. This shows Bradley's affinity for the 
popular notion. He wants to keep his theory of free-will as 
close to the popular notion of responsibility, as it is 
possible,
The popular notion of responsibility arises from
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the idea of punishment. In the naive mind, responsibility 
stands for punishment. Where we have the one, we have the 
other. Bradley thinks that if a theory can justify 
punishment it should also be able to explain moral 
responsibility.
To the naive mind the conditions of one's becoming 
a subject to moral imputation are:
(1) One must maintain personal identity^
(2) The action must proceed from one's own will^
(3) One must be a moral agent and sufficiently intelligent 
to understand moral distinctions.
These criteria of responsibility have been applied 
by Bradley to the cases of Indeterminism as.; well as of 
Determinism. Bradley's first objection to Indeterminism 
is that it holds that a man is not free unless he has 
freedom of choice over and above freedom of action. But 
this is not consistent with the popular notion, according 
to which "a man can act freely without exercising choice.”^ 
It is rather difficult to understand how one can 
act freely without exercising choice. Like other conditions 
of moral imputation the condition of freedom of choice is 
an important and indispensable one. This is what Eant means 
when he says 'ought* implies 'can'. To say that 'a person 
ought to have done otherwise', means that 'he could have
1. ES, p.10.
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done otherwise’. The moral appraisal loses its meaning 
unless the action is really within the range of the agent's 
abilities - unless there is a real possibility of alternative 
action.
It seems that Bradley wants to mean that sometimes 
people act without actually deliberating or choosing 
between alternatives. For instance, "going to the 
refectory for lunch" does not involve any positive 
deliberation. But still it is free in the sense that it 
follows from my will, and I am a moral agent retaining 
personal identity, and fully conscious of moral distinctions 
and of what I am going to do. These are sufficient to 
declare that ‘'going to the refectory for lunch" is a free 
action for me.
But it must be pointed out that even in this case, 
there is an implicit choice of going or not-going, although 
I may not be conscious of it. It is difficult to find out 
an action which is free, but at the same time does not 
involve any choice or deliberation. The question of choice 
or deliberation is not so much important in the case of 
other actions, as it is of actions involving moral 
responsibility. Bradley has neither included this freedom 
of choice in his list of conditions, nor has he said 
anything definite about it although his entire metaphysical 
position is against it.
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The second objection which Bradley has brought 
against Libertarianism is that it is mainly negative in its 
implications and as such is incompatible with the vulgar 
notion of responsibility. Here free-will means chance or 
non-determinism. According to them, our volition or will is 
not determined by anything at all, they are the uncaused 
causes of our action.
Bradley, following Hume and Mill, takes this to mean 
that there is no rational connection between our volition 
and action. This is equivalent to saying that actions are 
in no case the result of a given character in a given 
position. "The self, or the will, of Indeterminism is not 
the man, not the character at all, but the mere characterless
p
abstraction which is 'free*, because it is indifferent."
Such a doctrine fails to adjust itself to the 
popular notion of a moral agent. If the agent does not know 
what he is going to do next, and what his action will be, 
unless it is done, he cannot be held responsible for his 
action. No one will differ with Bradley in holding that the 
Libertarianism, in its strict sense, is an establishment of 
chance. The Libertarians hold that in order to be free, an 
action must be self-caused, whereas the self is not caused by 
anything else. If the self is determined by factors other
1. ES. p.11.
2. ES. p.12.
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than the self, then there will be a causal continuity, 
which means that the cause of the action, is not confined 
within the self, but can be traced further back and the 
action is not free in the sense of being caused by 
the self only. Hence, in order to have a free action, the 
self must not be caused or determined by something else.
But this means a break in the causal continuity which is 
equivalent to chance.
It is true, that in our daily life we often admit 
some amount of chance. For instance, we take chance, when 
we stake money in the horse-race, or in football pool.
Of course, in most of the cases, chance is based on our 
ignorance of the causal situation. But chance, in the 
sense of indifference, is really detrimental to the popular 
notion of moral appraisal.
If the Libertarians hold that freedom means freedom 
from causal necessity, then Bradley is right in criticising 
them. "And if it be true of any man, that his actions are 
matters of chance, and his will in a state of equilibrium, 
disturbed by contingency, then ... the question whether such 
a being is a moral agent, is answered as soon as raised."^
All this is introducing the conception of personal 
identity which is required for the infliction of punishment
1. ES. p.13.
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and accountability. Unless the agent is the same agent, 
unless there is a pervasive identity beneath his fleeting 
states of mind, he cannot be held responsible for what he 
did.
Here Bradley has not advanced much from his 
empirical predecessors. On the contrary, he agrees with 
them jji holding that action must in some sense arise from 
the character. But he differs from Hume and Mill, in his 
formulation of the nature of self. The self, for him, is an 
all-inclusive self-determining coherent whole which realises 
itself in and through the moral actions. It is a continuing 
principle of action which makes decisions on moral grounds, 
and as such, is different from the Humean conception of 
self.
It is a common argument against Hume that his notion 
of the self, as a collection of fleeting mental states, 
cannot explain the idea of self-sameness demanded by our 
moral appraisal. Bradley holds that the Humean account of 
action following from character is inconsistent with his 
analysis of the self. The self, for Hume, is a perpetual 
flux. The contents of it are fleeting and temporary# There 
is nothing permanent in the self, which can maintain its 
identity. Bradley thinks that such a conception of the 
self engenders difficulties. In the ordinary conception of 
"collection", the whole is never conscious of itself. But
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in the case of the self, it is. Moreover, a collection is 
not generally something other than its parts. But here, the 
self is other than the desires although it has the desires. 
Hence, to call a self a collection of mental states, is not 
to describe it correctly so far as the plain man understands 
it.
It can be argued in favour of Hume, that his two 
views, viz., the action follows from the character and the 
self is a collection of fleeting mental states, are 
logically independent of each other. What Hume wants to 
mean is that the action follows from a cause which is a 
motive or volition of the person concerned. In this sense, 
he thinks that the action is determined by the character. 
This actually has no connection with his notion of the self. 
The self may be a bundle of mental states, and at the same 
time a determining cause. But this argument cannot put Hume 
right. For, he not only insists that the action must follow 
from the character, but that it must follow from something 
"durable and constant". This durability and constancy is 
not obtainable in the Humean notion of self. Therefore it 
fails to be consistent with the idea of internal identity.
In order to have the self-sameness, self must be continuous 
and identical.
The empirical theory of mind cannot explain the fact
97
of personal identity. I am conscious of remaining 
essentially the identical person as I was five years ago 
- this fact cannot he accounted for, hy a bundle of 
discrete mental states. Mill has acknowledged this 
paradoxical character of the empirical conception and 
admits that here we are face to face with a "final 
inexplicability".
Bradley's conception of the self as an inherent 
abiding principle manifesting itself in desires and wills, 
is more appropriate for the explanation of the problem of 
personal identity. But once such a connection or 
continuity is allowed, the possibility of the prediction 
of human action creeps in. If there is a link between my 
character and action, one who knows my character, can 
predict my action. The Libertarianism holds that, human 
action, if free, is unpredictable, and if it is predictable, 
then responsibility has no meaning.
But the popular notion of responsibility is not 
always in contradiction with the idea of prediction. "A 
man of healthy mind has no objection to the prediction of 
any action which he looks on as issuing from his character."^
The same type of thinking we can find in Mill also, 
who in his logic, says "We do not feel ourselves the less 
free, because those to whom we are intimately known are
1. ES. p.16.
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well assured how we shall will to act in a particular case."^
That the common man believes in rational prediction, 
Bradley continues, is evident from the fact that even when 
he knows that he will commit something again and again, 
he does not doubt his responsibility.
This shows that the Libertarianism is not consistent 
with the popular notion of responsibility which supposes 
some amount of predictability.
Nor is the popular idea of responsibility consistent 
with the Necessitarianism, which supposes the total 
predictability of human action. The naive man does not 
question the legitimacy of responsibility, so long as 
the prediction is made on the basis of the knowledge of his 
character. But if the idea of prediction can be traced 
further back soon it will be found to be derived from 
factors or elements not involved in one * s own character .
Bradley is right here in pointing out that 
Determinism will contradict its own theory if it does not 
mean total predictability. It cannot stop short at a 
particular stage and thus makes itself coincide with the 
popular notion.
Bradley calls this total predictability rational 
prediction. By rational prediction he means calculation 
beforehand by certain laws, and from given data of a definite
1. J.SMIillV Logic: Bk.VI, Ch.II, p.422. 1875.
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result. When such, calculation is made in the case of human 
action, it means deduction of human action from factors 
which are not in human character, i.e. construction of 
oneself out of what is not oneself. It is this rational 
prediction that the plain man objects.
According to Bradley, total rational prediction 
contradicts the popular notion because of two reasons;
(1) To say actions are foreknown is to say that they are 
pre-existent, and therefore they are not his,^ and he is 
not accountable for them. This means that if something is 
known, it must exist. To know the actions beforehand, is to 
know them as existent.
Indeed, if something is before me now, it is not in 
the future, and knowledge of it is not knowledge of the 
future. But whether this is applicable in the case of future 
events is doubtful.
Firstly, the term ’fore-knowledge' means knowledge 
beforehand of the future or of something else which has not 
yet occurred, i.e. which is not yet existent, but will be 
so. There would be no question of fore-knowing the event or 
action unless it were in the future. If the term ’fore­
knowledge' is used in the sense of 'pre-existence*, then it 
will lose its meaning.
1. ES. p » 18.
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Secondly, as A.J. Ayer says, "to pre/cognize something 
is to know, not what ^  happening, hut what will happen, 
just as to remenher something is, in this sense, to know, 
not what is happening, hut what has happened. To argue that 
if one were to precognize a future event it would he not 
future at all, hut present, is just as ahsurd as to argue 
that if one remembers a past event, it is present and not 
past;
Later, in his definition of the will, Bradley says 
that, "Will is the self-realization of an idea with which
p
the self is identified." This means that to will something, 
the idea of an ideal form of it must he inside me, hut not 
the thing itself. In a similar way, it can he said that 
the fore-knowledge of a thing is a knowledge of what it 
will he, not of its actual heing. If it is a construction^ 
it is an ideal construction.
Bradley's plain man does not think that the actions 
pre-exist, if foreknown, so long the prediction is made 
from factors involved in his character. His objection is 
directed only against predictions made on non-personal 
factors. But even when the action of an individual is 
predicted from certain non-personal factors, what is
1. A.J.Ayer: The problem of knowledge: Ch.IV, p.187*
Edt. 1956.
2. P. Bradley: Collected Essays. Vol.II. Ch.XXXVT. p.4-76.
Ed.1955.
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actually done is to formulate the future results from a 
certain causal principle. To know this causal principle and 
the particular data, is not to know the effect as co­
existent with them.
It may he argued that if the effect is known, it 
must he known as true and once it is true, it must he true 
always, i.e. it is true in the present as well as in the 
past. But the point is that truth belongs to propositions 
and facts, whereas time belongs to events. When I predict 
that he will kill a man tomorrow, the proposition "he will 
kill a man tomorrow" claims to he true and therefore 
timeless. But the event to which it refers and which will 
make it true has a claim to time and date. It is this event 
which is still in future and has not occurred yet.
It appears from what Bradley says that if the 
actions are foreknown, then they would he existent, hut 
not the individual to whom the actions belong. But there 
cannot he an action in isolation. It is an action with 
reference to an individual. If the individual is not existent, 
then the action cannot he there. If the actions are existent, 
then they must he the action of an individual, who is 
equally existent with them.
Bradley has pushed the idea of rational prediction
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to an extreme that is not desired even by the 
determinists.^ Hume speaks of the predictability of human 
action when one knows the character and the conditions of 
the man concerned. But he does not consider whether they are 
predictable even when the individual is not existent. Mill 
speaks of the desire to mould one's own character as one of 
the determining conditions. But this is not a pre-personal 
datum. The point is this. The Determinists do not claim 
(as Bradley thinks they do), that things are predictable 
even when they are not experienced. Determinism presupposes 
some amount of knowledge of the individual in order to 
predict his action. Neither Hume, nor Mill has supposed 
that an apriori construction of individual behaviour is 
possible even when the individual is not existent. That is, 
in fact, contrary to their empirical standpoint. Even when 
the elements are known, it is "their elements" which are 
known and not "elements" in abstraction.
(2) As to the second reason: It is difficult for a person to 
conceive himself as becoming. "How can he (there already) 
become himself and how can he (there still) be ceasing to 
be himself.
1. ES. p.17. "... The ordinary man would probably be little 
short of horrified to find that the whole of his history, 
everything which has gone to settle his character, every 
element in the evolution which has made him what he is, 
had been foretold in detail before his birth."
2. ES. p.19.
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It is true that the plain man finds this difficult 
to grasp. The very word "becoming" is unfamiliar to him.
But if it means change from one state to another, he does 
not find any difficulty to understand it. He can easily 
observe himself to become something which he was not before, 
e.g. he feels himself suddenly to become angry from a state 
of calmness; he observes himself to become an adult from 
a state of childhood.
Bradley says "That a man was accountable because he 
himself and no other, has acted; and ... the possibility of 
the explanation of his self means that his self does not 
exist at all, and therefore, of course, cannot act.
Bare, Bradley seems to be too hasty in drawing his
conclusions. To take another example, 'water' can be
explained in terms of Hydrogen and Oxygen; HgO makes water. 
But this does not mean that water does not exist at all, 
and does not quench our thirst. Similarly, even when the 
self is explained, it does exist and does act. The only 
appropriate question to ask here is whether a person will
be responsible for such and such an action.
The charge which Bradley brings against the 
necessitarians, is that they fail to interpret the popular
1. ES. p.21.
104
belief. They fail because they ignore the rational self in 
the form of the will, in the act of volition, in the abiding 
personality, which is the same throughout all its acts, 
and by which alone imputation gets a meaning.^
He also rejects the idea of total rational prediction 
from pre-personal data on this ground. According to him, 
human behaviour is predictable when it can be brought under 
certain general laws. But such general laws cannot be 
formulated because "no two men are ever born the same", and 
such laws, since they are abstractions, will be mere empty 
opinions.
The crux of the whole problem seems to be lying here. 
There is no logical inconsistency in saying with the 
determinists, that if conditions are known then human action 
is predictable. It is true that sometimes correct prediction 
of human action can be made on the basis of the knowledge 
of dispositions and habits which are more or less permanent, 
and easy to detect* But the character itself is something 
more than one’s disposition and it is always liable to be 
influenced by internal as well as external factors, and is 
thus changeable. To quote A.E.Taylor, "It is not a fixed 
unvarying quantity given once for all at some period in the 
individual's development, and thence forward constant; it is 
itself theoretically at least 'in the making' throughout
1. ES. p.53.
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To predict anything on the basis of this "varying 
character" cannot be absolutely certain. The practical 
impossibility of the prediction of behaviour from the 
knowledge of one's own character lies in the fact that what 
we call character is a developing structure which is never 
completely knowable. This is also true of our dispositions 
which sometimes remain latent barring the way of knowing 
them completely.
This idea of development or progress is ah unique 
factor in the conception of self, which is totally neglected 
by the empiricists. The empiricists regard mind as a 
bundle of invariable atomic particles which can have 
external relations of co-existence and sequence with the 
actions. Just like material particles, their nature can be 
generalised, and expressed in terms of universal laws, 
which would enable one to predict.
But, as we have already seen, mental contents unlike 
physical particles, are not unvarying in nature. They are 
predictable to some extent and Bradley does not object to 
that; but the total rational prediction from pre-personal 
data or "the theoretical development of the characterized 
self "collides with popular morality, as it fails to
1. A.E.Taylor: Elements of Metaphysics: p.374, 1924.
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explain for the creative activities or actions exhibiting 
the idea of progress. This is what we cannot comprehend 
even when we know the elements of which an individual's 
character is composed of.
It must be pointed out that Hume and Mill do not use 
'necessity' in this extreme sense. What they mean is "no 
more than the regularity of his volitions, the possibility 
of telling from his character", and this, Bradley thinks, 
is not in contradiction with popular notion. But Bradley 
is right when he points out that although Hume and Mill 
continuously insist on the special meanings of the terms 
'cause' and 'necessity', in practice, they do not differ 
much from the popular usage of the terms. Even in their 
restricted sense, these terms are expected to produce the 
the same effects on human mind, which they do wheg# taken 
in their popular sense.. Bradley rightly remarks, that if 
we explain human behaviour in terms of regularity, men are 
no more free "than a candle or a coprolite".
The cause of the difference between the Humeans and 
Bradley, is that they entertain two different philosophical 
attitudes. For Hume and Mill, the problem of freedom 
arises from a non-ethical consideration. They try to explain
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the mind in terms of regularity of sequence, the conception 
of which they have obtained from the physical world. Their 
aim is to discard the freedom of indifference. But Bradley 
refuses to explain the mind in terms of physical causation. 
He appeals to the common sense notion which differs from 
that of Hume and Mill. "The vulgar are convinced that a 
gulf divides them from the material world; they believe 
their being to lie beyond the sphere of mere physical laws; 
their character, or their will is to them, their thinking 
and rational self, and they feel quite sure that it is not 
a thing in space to be pushed here and there by other 
things outside it."^
To speak frankly this is not only the vulgar 
conception, but also of the Hegelians including Bradley. 
This is rather that characteristic of the idealistic 
thinking as such which has polemical differences with the 
psychological empiricism of Hume and Mill. They agree 
that the character is formed from our dispositions, habits 
and other factors. Hume and Mill do not believe that there 
is anything over and above the formed character of a man, 
whereas Bradley thinks that there is a 'self* over and 
above this formed character. It is true that our character 
governs our will, but Hume and Mill do not go beyond this, 
whereas Bradley thinks that the self is the ultimate source
1, Ethical Studies, p.2#. ^5”,
103
of action. The root of their difference lies in their 
different attitudes towards the idea of causation. For Hume 
and Mill mechanical causation is the paradigm of all sorts 
of causal enterprise and is the ultimate explanation of the 
world. For Bradley, the whole causal explanation centres 
round the notion of the self. His notion of self- 
realisation is not mechanical or atomic. It involves the 
notion of seIf-transcendence directing towards a final 
cause.
Bradley’s next charge against Necessitarianism is 
that of the wrong interpretation of the notion of 
punishment, so far as the vulgar understands it.
To the vulgar there is a necessary connection between 
punishment and guilt. "Punishment is punishment only where 
it is deserved," "Punishment is the denial of wrong by 
the assertion of r i g h t , a n d  since assertion of right is 
an end in itself, therefore punishment is also an end in 
itself.^
This view is essentially retributive and is in direct 
opposition with the utilitarian theory of Mill, As we have 
seen before there are two ends, which for Mill, are enough 
to justify punishment, viz. the benefit of the offender 
as well as the benefit of the society. For Mill and other
Ic ES. p,27.
2. ES. p o 28.
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Necessitarians, "punishment is avowedly never an end in 
itself, it is never justifiable except as a means to an 
external end.
But Bradley thinks "that punishment is inflicted
2
for the sake of punishment".
Bradley is right so far as he conceives that the two
s
ends, as pr^cribed by Mill, alone, cannot justify punishment 
unless they are supplemented by some other considerations.
He is also right in pointing out that the Retributive 
theory is the true expression of the plain man's view. The 
desire for inflicting punishment upon the culprit, arises 
usually from the feeling of vengeance of the vulgar mind.
But his Retributive theory has its own difficulties. Its 
practical difficulty is to fix the amount of physical 
punishment for a moral offence, as it has no measuring 
criterion - either internal or external. Just like Mill, 
Bradley has forgotten to consider the role of the 
individual as a moral agent and the nature of the cause 
of his action.
Punishment is justified because of what it does, i.e. 
what good effect it can produce on the society and on the 
individual. Without this end in view, punishment would be 
unjustifiable and meaningless. It is true that the vulgar 
demands retribution whenever he becomes a victim of offence,
1. ES. p.50.
2. ES. p.28.
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and he is not very conscious of the deterrent and 
reformatory aspects of punishment. Yet, to appeal to the 
vulgar opinions and to take it as an ideal expression of 
punishment, is not after all philosophical.
But all these are not enough for inflicting 
punishment. In order to punish a man for what he has done, 
we must go hack and consider the causal factors - viz. 
whether the person is a moral agent, whether he was really 
free at the time of his action.
According to the Necessitarianism responsibility 
implies punishment and conversely. But Bradley thinks that 
it fails to explain punishment in the vulgar sense, and 
therefore it also fails to explain the vulgar notion of 
responsibility, "if ... on the theory of Necessity, I am 
not punishable in the ordinary sense then.••, I am not 
responsible either."^ Bradley has forgotten here that the 
necessitarianism of Hume and Mill does not claim to be a 
perfect interpretation of the vulgar opinion* If they have 
failed to explain moral responsibility in the popular sense, 
then that does not mean no responsibility at all, but 
responsibility is maintained in some other sense - say, in 
the utilitarian sense.
Later^ Bradley remarks that "the doctrine of
1. ES. p.52,
Ill
punishment is moral reaction, the reaction of the moral 
organizm against a rebellious member."^ I think 
Rashdall is correct when he says to this, that without a 
purpose such reactions are meaningless. If the purpose is 
to produce certain good effects on the society then
punishment is something other than retribution. If not,
2
then it is wholly immoral.
A phrase like 'reaction of the moral organizm' sounds 
like reflex action of the animate bodies and it seems there 
is an affinity between moral law and natural law. Natural 
laws are descriptive and they do not require any 
justification for their consequences. On the other hand 
moral laws are prescriptive and have always a reference 
to their effects. When punishment is inflicted it is 
inflicted according to some moral laws (legal laws are
morally justified laws). These moral laws on the basis 
of which punishment is inflicted, become justifiable only 
on the utilitarian ground - i.e. referring to consequences 
which they produce. The difficulty with the Retributive 
theory is that it does not consider these consequences which 
can justify the law.
1. Bradley: Collected Essays. Vol.I. Ch.VII. p.153* 1935#
2. Rashdall: Theory of Good and Evil. Vol.I. Ch.IX, p.288 
note; 192^.
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Bradley also thinks that punishment is the ’denial 
of the wrong' and 'assertion of the right'. This clearly 
suggests some purposes for which punishment is inflicted.
And once we have purposes other than guilt we cannot call 
it any more retributive.
Bradley thinks that punishment is punishment only 
when it is deserved. If so, then when the innocent person 
becomes victim of pain or sufferings, then that cannot be 
called punishment. Quinton has rightly remarked, that 
"the Retributive thesis ... is not a moral doctrine but an 
account of the meaning of the word punishment." Bradley's 
analysis of punishment stands more for the definition of 
the word, than for its justification. It is true that 
punishment always implies guilt, that is, punishment must
trsAJi
be punishment for something. But jPure ^uilt cannot be a 
sufficient condition of punishment.
Thus, though Bradley tries to interpret correctly 
the vulgar notion of punishment, he fails to justify it.
Even if retribution is one of the aspects of punishment, it 
does not answer the fundamental question regarding 
responsibility, and that is, whether a man is really free in 
the sense of enjoying a capacity of doing otherwise than 
what he did.
According to Bradley then, neither Determininism nor
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Indeterminism is consistent with the popular notion of 
morality. They fail because the former of them leaves no 
room for the conception of the self which is demanded by 
the vulgar notion of morality, and the latter separates 
completely the self from the principle of causal necessity. 
Both these are incompatible with the popular belief. The 
question which arises now is that if both of them fail to 
justify moral responsibility, how we could save it. What 
is the end that will justify morality.
Bradley says that there is only one answer to this 
question. Morality is an end in itself and this end is self- 
realization.
In the ordinary sense, self-realization not only 
means our ability to actualize our potentialities, but 
also that the realization of these potentialities is the 
objective of our lives. We have certain norms or goods 
which we have set for ourselves, and we act accordingly 
to realize those goods.
By self-realization, Bradley means something more. 
According to him all our efforts and actions are directed 
towards the realization of the self as a whole. All our 
small desires and wishes are connected with one another -
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leading continuously towards an all-embracing whole. This 
idea of the whole serves as the end for us, guiding and 
directing our activities. The self manifests itself in a 
plurality of states and activities and in and through them 
realizes itself as a self-conscious, seIf-determining entity,
To this Bradley further adds that in order to will 
something, the ideal form of the thing must be within 
oneself with which his self is identified. Hence whatever 
is desired or wished, is somehow identified with the self 
and not something outside of the self and thus in that sense 
realization of the self as a whole.
To speak clearly, self-realization means 
systematization, and rationalization of the moral life 
discarding all inconsistencies and contradictions. The idea 
of moral responsibility is thus justified through an attempt 
to procure a good self rather than a bad self.
Such a conception of self-realization seems to be 
very high-sounding. But the problem is how far it can 
justify the popular notion of morality which Bradley is so 
keen to save. It is his opinion that if a philosophical 
notion falls short of the vulgar opinion, so much the 
worse for the philosophical opinion.
The freedom which Bradleyan philosophy can assert
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Consists of a gradual realization of one's own self, guided 
and determined by the conception of a whole. Here freedom 
is expressed in the form of degrees of realization of one's 
true self. But this is undoubtedly not a freedom which 
implies a freedom of choice, a capacity for doing an action 
otherwise. This latter type of freedom is that which is 
demanded by the popular notion.
The freedom which stands for the freedom of action 
or of choice is not possible from the Bradleyan standpoint. 
The very conception of a 'coherent whole' is incompatible 
with the popular idea of an action's being otherwise. The 
proposition 'can anyone do otherwise than what he has 
done' cannot be explained or justified from the standpoint 
of a rational all embracing coherent self, which realizes 
itself in and through our desires. All our desires are 
guided and determined by the principle of self-consistency.
How far this metaphysical notion of the absolute 
self is acceptable is a different question which does not 
arise here. But one thing is certain that such a 
conception is diametrically opposite to the ordinary mind. 
Bradley justifies himself for giving up the common sense 
position by saying that, "... vulgar are after all vulgar, 
we should not at pains to agree with their superstitions..."' 
But ultimately not agreeing with the 'vulgar' and
1. ES. p.41.
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introducing a completely different type of explanation than 
those of Hume and Mill, Bradley has avoided the main issue 
of the problem of free-will instead of answering it. His 
credit lies in unravelling the inconsistencies of 
Libertarianism and Necessitarianism, but so far as his 
theory is concerned, it is no better an explanation of the 
philosophical problem of free-will.
It is difficult to deny the operation of causal 
necessity in the case of motive and action. It is further 
difficult to deny the conviction of an immediate feeling 
of freedom in our action. To explain this irreconciliability 
by means of an absolute self-determining self or ego is to 
shift the problem from one sphere to another. Without such 
a presupposition of all embracing self, the irreconciliabil­
ity remains as it is.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
We are now in a position to sum up the results of 
the preceding chapters.
The approaches of Hume, Mill and Bradley towards 
the problem of free-will, are made from two different 
metaphysical positions. But in spite of the differences of 
their philosophies, there occurs a considerable amount of 
common ground.
Their basic similarity lies in the fact that all of 
these three philosophers want to say something from the 
standpoint of commonsense. Each one of them has started 
his speculation from the popular conceptions of morality, 
responsibility, blame and imputation. 'The Hume-Mi11 
explanation of free-will is nothing but the application of 
the same 'historical plan method* which Locke has applied 
for the clarification of philosophical problems from the 
standpoint of commonsense. It claims to be a consistent 
empirical analysis of what we 'ordinarily believe ' and 
'presumably think' of the notion of free-will. Neither 
Hume, nor Mill wants to go beyond the evidences of common 
experience.
On the other hand, Bradley, though he is not very 
keen on commonsense morality, because he thinks that Mill 
and other empiricists want to uphold common-sense view
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and he is glad in showing that commonsense is in conflict 
with empiricist views of person and morality, he still takes 
the 'vulgar notion' as the criterion of moral responsibility. 
Even when he could no more retain the popular notion of 
moral responsibility and freedom, he wants to keep his 
idealism as close to it as is possible. His idealistic 
treatment of the problem of free-will, claims to be the 
most accurate interpretation of the popular notion.
The difficulty with all these three philosophers 
is that although they have started with the commonsense 
view, they cannot stick to it, and the moment they abandon 
the commonsense view, they become obscure and put forward 
views which are totally incompatible with the plain man's 
conception of free-will.
This is more conspicuous in Bradley, when he turns 
from the 'vulgar notion' to the notion of a rational absolute 
self which gradually realizes itself through the exercise 
of volition. Vhen freedom, in the hands of Bradley, becomes 
a rational attainment measurable in terms of self- 
consistency, then it has little resemblance with the 
popular notion of free-will.
The same difficulty is also observable, however, in 
the Hume-Mill analysis. In their zeal for applying the 
causal principle to human action, they forget to keep room
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for choice which is essentially connected with the ordinary 
notion of free-will.
Bradley's conception of self-realization is too 
abstract and philosophical to be comprehended by the 
ordinary men, whereas the Hume-Mill version is too 
mechanistic to do justice to the popular sentiments. Hence 
though they have attempted to have a true interpretation 
of the commonsense view, their philosophies stand in the 
way of having it.
The Humean as well as the Bradleyan analysis are 
equally deterministic. They do not want to deny the 
operation of the causal principle in the case of volition 
and action. Will is as causal for Bradley, as it is for 
Hume and Mill. But they differ so far as the interpretation 
of the causal situation is concerned, and this, of course, 
diminishes the similarity.
For Bradley, actions are caused by the self as a 
whole. The self may be formed from dispositions and 
circumstances; but so far as actions are concerned, the self 
has its own determination, and this determination cannot 
be totally accounted for by universal laws of behaviour and 
tendencies.
For Hume and Mill, the conception of causality is 
a necessary outcome of the mechanical science prevalent in
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18th and 19th centuries, according to which events are 
discrete and separate and the relation among them is 
essentially relations of co-existence and sequence. When 
this principle is applied to the mind, we get what is 
called psychological atomism. The events of the mind become 
as separate, discrete and externally related as the physical 
particles of mechanics are. The causal relation among such 
mental events is nothing but an invariable sequence.
Such a mechanical interpretation gives us a very 
different picture of the mind than that of the idealists. 
Here, whenever we want to have a knowledge of the mind, we 
have the knowledge of this or that particular idea which 
is thought to be more.or less atomic in character.
The mechanical interpretation of the mind helps the
empiricists to uphold the principle of predictability. 
Prediction is only possible in terms of unchangeable units 
or elements which enter into relations with one another. 
Physical objects seem to have such claimed stability 
(though not always) and, thereforeare usually predictable.
If the contents of the milnd, like physical elements, 
are separate units, entering into mechanical external 
relation with one another, then prediction of them would be 
easier. But they are far from being so. The mistake of Hume
and Mill lies in interpreting motives and volitions as units
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or elements which can co-exist with, and have the relation 
of sequence with actions in the way in which physical 
particles can.
The merit of Bradley lies in the fact that he has 
recognized this mistake of Hume and Mill. He accepts 
predictability only so far as it comes from the knowledge 
of the personal character. But absolute predictability of 
all human action, which both Hume and Mill admit, is never 
accepted by Bradley. He thinks that the mental behaviour 
or volition and action, although causal, demands a new 
analysis of cause rather than the mechanical interpretation 
of it. Bradley seems to be more logical and plausible than 
Hume and Mill in recognizing two other factors involved 
in the notion of free-will, which are either, overlooked 
by the Humeans, or their mechanical determinism does not 
allow them.
These two factors are the notions of self and 
progress involved in free action. The notion of 'self* 
occupies a very significant position in the ideas of 
freedom and predictability. Bradley is correct in 
recognizing the notion of a self in the 'vulgar*s^ conception 
of freedom. For Bradley, the self is a developing idea, a 
changing entity. It is not static enough to be completely
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■predictable. For, Bradley says that much is predictable,and 
follows Mill on that.
In a similar way, the concept of progress also 
occupies a unique position in human behaviour. In the 
physical world we find change, but human behaviour not only 
exhibits change, it also shows elements of progress. It is 
Bradley's suggestion, that things which are progressing or 
developing, do not come within the range of prediction. 
Bradley thinks that creative activities - the activities of 
the genius cannot be predicted. In 'The Presupposition of 
Critical History', he says:
"For a people only in the period of their stagnation, 
for a person only when character and the station have 
become fixed forever, and when man is made, is it possible 
to foreknow the truth of the fresh achievement, and where 
progress has its full meaning and evolution is more than a 
phrase, there the present is hard and the future is 
impossible to discern.
This does not mean that, since the 'self is a 
developing idea, it is absolutely unpredictable. It is 
predictable, so far as it does not change. The self has two 
aspects: the permanent aspect, built and stored up from the 
dispositions and circumstances, and the developing aspect
1. F.H.Bradley: The Presupposition of Critical History: 
Collected Essays, Vol.I, p.5, 1955*
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. emerging from the former, but may be a total negation of
it. Bradley says, "... the character of a person does
follow, as a result, from his natural endowment together
with his environment. If his self is the negation of all
its particulars, that does not mean that it is not
determined by them"
The question which Bradley raises here is that the
action or the character of the man or of the society would
be predictable only when they are entities that could be
inferred from given data. Hume and Mill have treated human
character as an entity which, like actions of inanimate
objects, can be inferred from certain fixed data with the
help of certain laws. But Bradley says, "If the individual
self and society are 'compositions' of that order that a
knowledge of their elements gives you, apart from experience,
a knowledge of the individuals, then you can 'compound'
them and construe them apriori; but if they are not, you 
2
cannot." Bradley's answer is that they are not, whereas
physical objects are. Therefore, predictability in the case
of physical objects does not offer a right to pronounce that
mental behaviour is also predictable. "Give you what
knowledge of 'laws' and what particular existing data you
%
please, you cannot calculate the future."^
1. ESc p.22.
2. ES. po25.
5. ES. p.22.
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The recognition of this idea, that the self is a 
developing entity, is missed hy the empiricists. Their 
principle of mechanical causation fails to account for the 
notions of progress and development involved in human 
behaviour and the idea of the self which is the source of 
such dynamic activities.
This failure of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
century empiricists is due to their philosophical 
perspective. For them philosophy is essentially 
epistemological which again is closely connected with 
psychology. The philosophical problems for them ultimately 
lead to psychological analysis. Hence, the solution of any 
philosophical problem consist^ in finding out the actual 
mental process of the occurrence of the problem concerned, 
i.e. to give an accurate phenomenological description of 
the relevant activities of the mind. Thus, for them, most 
of the philosophical problems are genetic problems. As a 
result, when they turn to the problem of free-will, they 
take it as a psycho-genetic problem and show more interest 
in developing its psychological aspect than the logical one. 
Both Hume and Mill are equally engrossed in determining 
whether there is such a state of the mind as the direct 
consciousness of free-will* It is also why they try so much 
to find out the sources of such an idea.
125
Bradley’s merit consists in segregating the problem 
of free-will from its psychological aspect. Of coiirse, it is 
true that the Humean Empiricism is the foundation of 
Bradley's success. Moreover, it would be wrong to call the 
Humean empiricism totally psychological. It is mainly 
psychological, but behind the psychological approach lies the 
logical one.
The significance of the notion self ’ which Bradley 
has recognized in the free-will problem, is in a way 
anticipated by Mill when he speaks of one’s own desire to 
mould one’s character.
With Hume and Mill the problem of free-will being a 
genetic problem is essentially connected with the idea of 
causal necessity. They are more concerned with the 
possibility or impossibility of the faculty of free-will.
And after proving the impossibility of such an ability from
their empirical standpoint, they declare the problem as a 
verbal one. But Bradley does not think that the problem is 
a pseudo-problem. Bradley points out that in dealing with 
freedom, we are actually dealing with moral responsibility 
which is the ground of our moral consciousness. The Hume- 
Mill theory, failing to account for the idea of ’self* and 
its determination, actually overlooks and minimizes this 
fact of moral responsibility.
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Although, successful in interpreting the naive 
conception of free-will, so far as it involves the 
conception of a self, Bradley can hardly be said to be 
successful in interpreting 'freedom* itself, as it is 
understood by the plain man. Bor Bradley, as we have already 
seen, a man can be called free only when his rational self 
dominates his actions and the freedom of actions is 
measurable in terms of self-consistency. According to this 
definition, freedom becomes a matter of degree* A man who 
works in accordance with his rational self, is more free 
than one who acts in accordance with his irrational self.
But sometimes this gives rise to situations which cannot 
be called free action from the commonsense standpoint, 
although it may be a free action from the Bradleyan stand­
point. Bor instance, the law of the country may force me to 
give up drinking which my rationality abhors, but my 
irrational self wants. Brom the commonsense point of view, 
here I am not free, but from the Bradleyan standpoint, I am* 
This is what ordinary men cannot understand. The common­
sense notion of free-will is related not only with the idea 
of deliberation but also with choice.
In this respect, the Hume-Mi11 theory of freedom 
is more convincing to the common man. By freedom, Hume means 
a power of acting or not acting according to the
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•determinations of will, whereas Mill means one’s desire to 
mould one’s character. For the ordinary men, these 
deliberations of will are a fact of common experience. 
Psychologically there is nothing wrong in it, as we do feel 
this freedom of action irrespective of the fact whether 
it is an ability or a state of the mind. But when pursued 
logically, the mechanical explanation of causal regularity 
does not, in fact, allow any possibility for determining an 
action otherwise than what will be, or what it is.
In this connection it is legitimate to ask how far 
Hume and Mill are successful in their reconciling project. 
Hume, originally does not think that his is a reconciling 
theory, although later, he becomes much more compromising.
He seems to be quite satisfied in distinguishing liberty of 
spontaneity from liberty of indifference, and regarding 
the former as the only type of freedom which men can enjoy 
in acting or not acting. The liberty of spontaneity does 
not contradict the law of causation and as such, human action 
can both be free and causally determined. The same thing 
happens with Mill. While admitting the full applicability 
of the law of causation to human action, he wants to retain 
the capacity of desiring otherwise. This does not tally with 
the notion of a regular invariable cause. The difficulty 
with Hume and Mill is that they do not consider the problem
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as a real one. They think that if the verbal confusions 
could be removed, there would be a problem no more. But the 
problem creeps in again in the form of a regular cause, and 
predictability, which under no circumstances, allow even the 
elementary freedom of action, required by moral 
responsibility. Both of them prefer to be determinists and 
at the same time upholders of free-action. But in the 
context of their mechanical empiricism one cannot help being 
a strong or hard determinist who leaves no room for an 
action being otherwise.
Neither Hume and Mill, nor Bradley can really give us 
a theory of free-will which is a compromise between the law 
of causation and free action and at the same time, which is 
a good interpretation of the popular conception of moral 
responsibility. Either we have to remain confined to a more 
intelligible but mechanical type of empiricism which with 
its notion of regular causation does not allow freedom at 
all; or we have to develop a philosophy of the self which 
puts the entire problem in another form from that which is 
utilised by commonsense.
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